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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### U.S. WAGING 'PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE' AGAINST SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 84 pp 84-88

[Article by Maj A. Kopylov: "The United States: Psychology at the Service of Aggression and Anticommunism"]

[Text] A "Soviet" motorized rifle regiment is closing with American mechanized and tank small units. Combat vehicles with red stars on the armor are waging battle against the Americans who are defending stubbornly.

What is this? An extract from a regular anticommunist opus on World War III with which Western specialists in anti-Soviet brainwashing of the population overload the book markets for dirty purposes of "psychological warfare" against socialism? No. It is a description of one of the "training" battles in the U.S. Armed Forces National Training Center which was presented in the Western press. As one of the associates of the center stated, units of the American army regularly participate in two-week exercises where they "fight" with the "enemy" who is dressed in Soviet uniforms and is armed with Soviet combat equipment or equipment similar to it. This, they say, permits disclosing and eliminating bottlenecks in the training of American troops. In addition, also worked out on the exercises under the direction of Pentagon specialists are problems in the psychological training of the servicemen for actions with an enemy who the Washington strategists name completely unambiguously--the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. The psychological processing of all personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces is accomplished in a frankly anti-Soviet spirit.

To realize its aggressive, imperialist intentions American imperialism, which has declared a "crusade" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, is using all means at its disposal, including science. Military psychology is also included among those branches of knowledge which have been placed at the service of the Pentagon. It exerts an influence on the practice of selecting mercenaries to man the armed forces, on the combat training and ideological processing of American servicemen, the improvement of troop control, the development of new combat equipment and weapons systems, and the conduct of "psychological warfare" against socialism.

Military psychology as an independent branch of knowledge was born in the United States back in the period of World War I. At that time, it was occupied

primarily with problems of the development and conduct of psychological tests for the selection of recruits for the army. At one time, V. I. Lenin pointed out that after World War I all the imperialist governments in the world began to fear the army which was open for peasants and workers and began to change over to all possible procedures for the selection of troop units (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 195). Such an evaluation is also valid as regards the practice which has become firmly established in the U.S. Army.

The sphere of activity of the military psychologists expanded significantly in the years of World War II and especially after its conclusion. On the basis of studies conducted at that time, in 1949 a four-volume "American Soldier" was published in the preparation of which a large group of psychologists and sociologists took part (134 people) headed by (S. Staufer, E. Zuckman), and (E. Lamzdeyn). In the course of American imperialism's aggression in Korea (1950-1953) the research department of the U.S. Army, the operations research department of Johns Hopkins University, and the Army Research Institute for the Study of Human Capabilities conducted work there simultaneously. Specialists of the Rand Corporation and the fourth group of psychological operations participated in the Vietnam adventure. In the Pentagon's published documents, considerable space was allotted to the psychological aspects of the wars in Korea and in Vietnam.

Now the United States occupies the leading position among the imperialist countries for studies in the field of military psychology. The increase in the requirements of the U.S. Armed Forces for its development is explained first of all by the intensification of American imperialism's aggressiveness, an increase in the role of the human factor in contemporary war, the aggravation of class, race, and other conflicts in the country which did not bypass the army, either, and the necessity to overcome the so-called "Vietnam syndrome." Tremendous significance is also had by the social order of the ruling circles which are striving to hold their positions with all their strength, to organize and stabilize by psychological means the effective functioning of the entire socio-political system of American imperialism, and to turn its armed forces into an obedient tool of an aggressive foreign and reactionary domestic policy.

A widely ramified network of appropriate organizations and institutions which have available a large apparatus of military psychologists has been created for the conduct of military-psychological studies and the use of the data obtained in the interests of improving the combat capability of the armed forces and their structure. In 1978 a book by the British sociologist, P. Watson, "Influencing the Human Mind. The Use and Abuse of Military Psychology," was published in the United States. In the course of the work on the book, the author visited eight countries on the American continent and a number of states in Europe and the Near East. He counted 146 institutions which are engaged in problems in the use of psychology in the army to one degree or another. One hundred thirty of them are located in the United States, in which 80 are actually in the system of the armed forces.

Institutes, specialized clinics, and so forth are also engaged in problems of military psychology. The elaboration of the theoretical principles of military

psychology is also being accomplished in the country's higher educational institutions on a contract basis. The leading military-psychological research institutes in the United States include the Institute for the Study of Human Capabilities (Alexandria, Virginia), the Center for the Study of Social Systems (Washington, D.C.), the Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California), the Center for the Study of the Psychology of Foreign States (New York), the Directorate for the Study of Armed Forces Personnel, and others.

A typical feature of American military psychology is the fact that it is directed not toward the solution of narrow psychological problems, as the military psychologists themselves assert, but first of all, of socio-political problems in the organizational development of the armed forces. We are speaking of tying psychology to the chariot of Washington's aggressive foreign policy even more strongly and using it more widely in the interests of preparing a new world war. Among the tasks which Army psychologists are accomplishing, a special place is occupied by the development of the forms, methods, and content of the ideological brainwashing of the personnel in an anti-Soviet, anticommunist spirit and the maintenance of the moral-psychological attitude of the personnel in the interests of the ruling circles' class requirements. As is known, the "Vietnam syndrome" was manifested in the demoralization of the American army and in numerous cases of insubordination, desertion, and soldiers' attempts on the lives of the most hated and cruelest commanders, as well as in the growth in drug addiction and the development of the antiwar movement in the country. According to data in the foreign press, in 1971 alone 250,000 cases of desertion were recorded in the U.S. Armed Forces. It is not by chance that overseas a tremendous number of books, pamphlets, and articles are being published on troop morale which define its factors and determine ways to raise the fighting-morale qualities of the servicemen. In the United States, there has been a sharp increase in attention to the study of the morale factor in war and its scrupulous consideration in the combat training of the troops. In the May edition of the military-theoretical journal MILITARY REVIEW (1983), it is proposed that the maintenance of high troop morale be considered a principle for the conduct of war.

Solution of the problem of the morale factor, in the opinion of the highest military command, can ensure the creation of favorable conditions for the attainment of political and military goals in case of the initiation of a large-scale war. Not wishing to admit that the low political-morale condition of the GI is a reflection of the overall socio-political picture of American society, the military leadership is trying to pass the problem of the morale factor as a purely psychological one. However, the true reasons which cause the numerous difficulties which the Pentagon is encountering in the morale-psychological processing of the troops are contained, in the end, in capitalist social relations which engender the class struggle, socio-political disunity, national dissension, and moral alienation.

The deepening crisis of capitalism, which affects all spheres of public life without exception, is manifested most acutely in the United States as the leading imperialist power. An ideological-political crisis which profoundly struck the social consciousness, the institutions of state authority, and society's moral foundations, has especially intensified recently. Nor could it bypass the armed



forces. For the social ulcers of a sick society also affect the army very sensitively. Many times already, prominent American state and military figures have admitted the devaluation of moral values in society and the army and the absence of "an inspiring national goal" and "fiery ideas."

Under conditions where the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are capturing the minds of hundreds of millions of people on earth, the American imperialists cannot counter our ideology with an effective theoretical weapon. Today the ruling circles of the United States are unable to give the soldier masses political ideas and moral ideals which could ensure their high political-moral state. Therefore, the Pentagon has recourse to means of psychological influence and is exerting a continuous effect on the feelings, attitudes, prejudices, habits, and traditions of the servicemen--on everything which is part of the content of social psychology.

An analysis of the aggressive wars unleashed by American imperialism in recent decades shows that the ruling circles of the United States always tried to camouflage their class interests under the guise of false, ultra-patriotic slogans and appeals and to introduce them into the social consciousness by methods and means of psychological pressure. Thus, a specialist in the field of military psychology, J. (Skovel), in the work, "Motivating the Behavior of the American Soldier in Limited Wars of the Future," asserts, for example, that the main reason for wars is not private ownership of the means of production and not the class-antagonistic division of society, but man's inclination toward pugnacity, and that the "aggressive essence of man" will remain unchanged in the future, too. Therefore, the majority of the American soldiers whose consciousness has been poisoned with ideas of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, great-power chauvinism and national arrogance, and enmity and hatred toward other peoples cannot understand the true reasons and nature of aggressive wars. In the period of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, the servicemen were called on to "defend the freedom of the South Vietnamese people," "repel the aggression coming from the North," "prevent a threat to the free world," and so forth.

It is noteworthy that the (Skovel) mentioned above is fighting for a return to the Nazi "experience" in the organizational development of the armed forces of the World War II period. It looks as though the practice of drilling and ideological brainwashing of the Hitlerite cutthroats and their readiness to kill wherever they please and whom they please is clearly to the liking of some in the American army. Really, don't the bloody crimes of the American militarists in Korea and Vietnam and, in our time, in Grenada and Lebanon tell about this?

To mold the corresponding stereotype of behavior in the GI, clinical psychology (it is concerned with the prevention and treatment of disorders of people's minds) and the psychology of associations (it studies the psychology of groups of people) received development in the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and especially in the U.S. Air Force. They are considered not only as medical-psychological branches of knowledge, but also as a means for the psychological regulation of Americans' behavior. Mental health clinics and centers for the study of the human factor are being created. Their tasks are reduced to preventing or

decreasing among the servicemen dissatisfaction with the conditions of army service, showing ways to adapt to them, and preventing mental disorders among the personnel. We note that in the years of World War II alone 1.5 million soldiers, sergeants, and officers suffered from them.

The most refined procedures are used in the interests of instilling in the American servicemen a hatred for the USSR and socialism. They are called upon to act, first of all, as the army psychologists believe, on the region of the subconscious and emotional sphere of the soldiers' minds. In the American army, as was noted in the beginning, special "aggressor" subunits have been created which resemble Soviet troops in weapons and uniforms. The subject matter of lessons with the personnel has been specially selected: "Democracy against Communism," "Know the Communist Enemy," and so forth. The Russian is your enemy, kill the Russian--this is what they want to instill in the American soldier using psychology.

However, practice shows that the attempts of the U.S. military command to patch up the breach in the moral-political potential of the armed forces personnel by relying on recommendations of military psychologists are not bringing the desired result. This is shown by numerous examples of the low moral-psychological state of the GI during aggressive actions unleashed by the United States in recent years in Korea, Indochina, the Near East, and in Latin America, and also by the practice of the troops' stay abroad where the reputation of the American servicemen among the local population is very low. Moreover, in the press of the countries where U.S. troops are billeted they have written many times about Yankee rowdies, robbers, rapists, drunks, and drug addicts.

In the conclusions of a special commission of the U.S. Congress which was involved with problems of drug addiction in the armed forces, it says that among the army officers one out of every five suffers from alcoholism. During the last 25 years, American warriors committed 150,000 various crimes in Japan alone. Antagonism between officers and enlisted men, racial conflicts, crimes of insubordination, and an attitude of self-interest toward service on which they look as a business and the opportunity to enrich oneself by any means continue to remain usual phenomena in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Many military-psychological studies in the U.S. Armed Forces are secret. However, an American scientist, (T. Narut), who took part in a conference on the problem of stress which took place within the framework of NATO, shed light on the nature of some works in this area. His presentation was set forth in detail in the British newspaper SUNDAY TIMES. (Narut) served in the U.S. Naval Medical Center in Naples. The doctorate dissertation which he prepared had the goal of disclosing the factors which can stimulate servicemen to kill people, in so doing not experiencing fear or spiritual torment. He developed a method, the essence of which was reduced to "educating" killers using special motion pictures on torture, mockery, and barbarity against people and their destruction. Adapting to situations in which blood is spilled, the trainees lose human feelings in the end from such a "procedure," not experiencing any pangs of remorse when performing murder. To train cutthroats, the psychologists specially selected servicemen who had gone through Vietnam or had committed crimes and had been sentenced to imprisonment.

(Z. Shtroyfert) undertook similar studies in the U.S. Navy. At one time, the programs of criminal psychological "experiments" of this figure were publicly exposed. (Shtroyfert's) work consisted of disclosing declassified, absolutely degenerate persons for whom human life is not even worth a cent and who can become thoughtless killers. He worked up a questionnaire of 135 questions to disclose such people and to select those who value their life a little more than the life of their associates and, when accomplishing difficult assignments, will be able to display the "ability to survive." This procedure may be used by the American military command to evaluate the attitude of the population of the country of proposed invasion toward its life and to predict its behavior in case of the territory's occupation by American troops.

In the U.S. Armed Forces, great attention is devoted to the study of the psychological aspects of the interrogation and torture of prisoners of war. In the bibliography prepared by the so-called Center for the Study of Social Systems, 122 separate studies on this problem are listed. American military psychologists are concentrating their efforts first of all on the development of interrogation methods which they divide into methods of torture and methods for "fine psychological pressure" on the prisoner to obtain the necessary information from him. Despite the provisions of the Geneva Convention on Handling Prisoners of War, which was also signed by representatives of the United States, wild fanatics in the cloaks of scientist-psychologists who are at the service of the Pentagon are proposing the most anti-human, sickening procedures: degrading the honor and dignity of the prisoner, threatening his relatives or friends, the employment of drugs, bestial torture, and so forth.

The Research Institute for the Study of Human Capabilities published a report which mentioned a series of experiments on sensory deprivation (total isolation of a person from external stimuli) under prisoner conditions which were conducted by one T. Meyers at military bases at the Presidio of Monterey (California) and Bethesda (Maryland).

In order to frighten those being tested and force them to talk, they were placed in solitary isolation chambers for four days. American servicemen came forth in the role of guinea pigs. Their cigarettes and watches were confiscated and during their stay in the chambers military psychologists observed their behavior. Then the "prisoners" underwent test trials to determine how much their morale had been broken by the stay in continuous isolation.

But these experiments seem to be rather harmless in comparison with tests on the influence of drugs on the human mind. One (D. Kubis) proposed using drugs for interrogation: ammonium-sodium, salt of barbituric acid, and others. Tests of the effect of the preparation meprobamate on the minds of servicemen were conducted in the U.S. Army. This preparation, as Pentagon psychologists state, can cause a condition in a person which is favorable for the conduct of an interrogation. Even now, about 50 tons of psychochemical substances intended for poisoning people's consciousness have been accumulated in the arsenals of the United States. There are data on the use of this barbarous type of weapon during the U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

In implementing the instructions of the Pentagon, military psychologists are continuing to improve the technique for the interrogation of prisoners of war. A



phrase book has been developed for the interrogation of prisoners in the interests of the "psychological warfare" service. It includes those questions with the aid of which the political-morale state of the enemy troops and population and the effectiveness of the influence of psychological operations on it can be evaluated.

Servicing the subversive activity of the U.S. special services, in particular the organs of "psychological warfare," is one of the important directions for the participation of military psychologists in the training of the armed forces. The American scientist, P. Linebarger, who is considered the godfather of psychological operations, thought: first, psychologists indicate those aspects of the mind which should be subjected to influence; second, they suggest methods to determine the enemy's morale; third, they assist the operational personnel who are waging "psychological warfare" in planning operations and evaluating the results of their influence; fourth, they help to direct the operations competently.

To prepare for war against the Soviet Union, American military psychology is occupied with the study of the moral-political potential of our country and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. The use of psychology to study the enemy's morale received the name "passive psychological warfare." Working in an intensified manner in this direction are the organizations which have already been mentioned, such as the Center for the Study of the Psychology of Foreign States, the Research Institute for the Study of Human Capabilities, the Center for the Study of Social Systems, the Psychological Warfare School at Fort Bragg, and others. Specialists in the field of psychology are studying the special features of political and operational thinking, the style of leadership and the adoption of decisions, the abilities of one or another military leader, and the special features of the national psychology of the enemy personnel and population and their moral-political state. Thus, during the Vietnam adventure of the United States associates of the Rand Corporation studied the motivation of the behavior and morale of the Vietnamese patriots.

According to press information, in peacetime psychological operations against the population of sovereign states are actively conducted by the appropriate organs of the U.S. Navy during the visits of American warships to foreign ports. As the American scientist (F. Lundis), the author of the doctoral dissertation, "Psychological Warfare and Secret Operations against the Mass Media in Chile" writes, the Pentagon's subversive activity in the field of psychological operations has certain stages, for each of which a draft manual has been prepared in the American army. In 1962, a manual for the conduct of "psychological warfare" against the USSR, which subsequently was made more precise many times, was prepared.

For the conduct of psychological operations under combat conditions, the U.S. Armed Forces have special formations which have been brought together in "psychological warfare" battalions, and the battalions--in "psychological warfare groups." The 1st Psychological Operations Battalion of the U.S. Army is now conducting active subversive propaganda against the population of occupied Grenada, trying to sow the seeds of anticommunism and enmity and hatred for the countries of socialism in the consciousness of the people. In trying to retain their positions in various areas of the world, the U.S. imperialists have declared the



just struggle of peoples for freedom and independence to be "terrorist activity" and are adopting measures for its suppression. Recently, a special directorate was created in the U.S. Air Force to combat "terrorism." Psychologists are also participating in it. In particular, they are studying the psychological aspects of insurrectional actions in countries of the "third world" and are engaged in disclosing the reasons and developing methods to combat the national-liberation movement.

Typically, many American scientists see the sources of this movement in the special features of the psychology of the participants in the national-liberation movement rather than in the socio-economic causes or in the increase in mass dissatisfaction with the policy of terror which has now been raised in the United States to the rank of state policy. Such psychologists as A. Molnar, J. Tinkler, and (J. Lituar) made a thorough analysis of the national-liberation movement in many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. With consideration of their analysis, in the 1970's in the American army they began the implementation of a program under the name "Operations Beyond the Borders of the United States to Ensure the Country's Security," for the implementation of which 5,000-6,000 people were involved.

A significant place in the subversive activity of psychologists, which is directed against the national liberation movement, is occupied by participation in the selection and training of personnel for actions against insurgents. This work was begun in the Research Institute for the Study of Human Capabilities with the determination of the psychological qualities which American cutthroats who are being sent to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America should possess.

Such are only some of the directions for the participation of military psychologists in the training of the U.S. Armed Forces. The sphere of their activity in the interests of the Pentagon's aggressive plans is constantly expanding. In the current fiscal year Washington has directed 26.2 billion dollars for the military aspects of scientific research and experimental design work, including military-psychological studies.

Thus, in the United States military psychology is a social product of American imperialism. Its misanthropic, reactionary role is manifested in the fact that it serves the interests of the American militarists and monopolies in the training of the armed forces for a war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the suppression of the class and antiwar actions of the workers within the country, the struggle against the national-liberation movement, and the defense of the imperial interests of the United States in various regions of the world. The criminal actions of American servicemen in Lebanon where they are causing brigandage and violence in concert with the Israeli aggressors, the interference of the U.S. imperialists in the affairs of Latin American states where, under the direction of Yankee bandit-instructors, they are killing peaceful residents of Nicaragua and meting out reprisals against the patriots of Salvador, the undeclared war against the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]--this is an incomplete list of the crimes of the overseas militarists and special services. Events show that the Department of Defense, supported by psychological

studies, is trying to train servicemen who are devoid of any moral inhibitions in the accomplishment of crimes in the interests of the aggressive course of the ruling circles.

The Pentagon's use of military psychology confirms the Lenin thesis on the parasitism of imperialism which, perverting the very essence of science, is directing efforts not for the good of man and not for the service of social progress, but for the destruction of people and the preparation of war.

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### ORGANIZATION-PARTY WORK CHIEF ON COMBAT READINESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 84 pp 23-31

[Article by Lt Gen V. Lukinykh, chief of Directorate of Organization-Party Work, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy: "High Effectiveness for Party Work"]

[Text] In an atmosphere of high political enthusiasm, the Soviet people are putting into practice the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee. The monolithic unity and close solidarity of the communists and all Soviet people around the Leninist CPSU Central Committee was demonstrated with new force by the special February (1984) plenum of the party Central Committee. The workers and men of the Armed Forces unanimously approve and support its decisions and the election of Comrade K. U. Chernenko, an outstanding figure of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, as the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The party now sees as the main thing the maintenance of the creative enthusiasm with which the people are seized, the preservation of the tempo which has been gained and the general attitude toward matters, and the steady rise in the level of party and state leadership. As was noted at the special plenum of the party Central Committee, measures which have been planned will be realized only in the case where their accomplishment will become the main content of the daily work of each party organization and each worker. The election campaign which has been completed in the party organizations again showed the high level of the communists' consciousness and activity.

The election meetings in the party organizations and party conferences became a practical review of party work in the Armed Forces. They permitted a comprehensive analysis and generalization of the work experience accumulated in the party organizations and political organs in the accomplishment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1982) and June and December (1983) plenums of the party Central Committee. The meetings and conferences summed up the results of party work directed toward the accomplishment of the tasks assigned by the Soviet minister of defense for the training of the troops and naval forces. And just as was required by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the conduct of reports and elections in party organizations, they contributed to the further strengthening of party ranks, the development of intra-party democracy, and the improvement of organizational and ideological work of the party organizations.

In the course of the reports and elections, an evaluation of the activity of the leading election organs and party commissions with political organs was given and their new personnel were elected. Many CPSU members took part in the discussion of the accountability reports of party committees and bureaus and 80 percent of the communists spoke in the party organizations and party groups.

In complete conformity with the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress, subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the instructions of the Soviet minister of defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the election meetings and party conferences adopted comprehensive decisions which determine the basic directions of organizational-party, ideological, and political-indoctrinational work of political organs and party organizations and ways for the further strengthening of its influence on all aspects of the life and combat training of the troops.

The main direction in the activity of the political organs and party organizations, in the future, too, remains the daily concern for the strengthening of the Armed Forces' combat might, raising the vigilance and combat readiness of the large units, units, and ships, and the mobilization of the communists and all personnel for the accomplishment of the important missions assigned by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to the Armed Forces in connection with the complication of the international situation.

As the reports and elections showed, the party organizations and political organs of the Armed Forces have accumulated considerable work experience in the accomplishment of tasks in combat readiness, combat alert duty, and field, air, and naval training. In the course of maneuvers and exercises, flights, and long naval cruises and in the accomplishment of assignments connected with the performance of international duty, party work was substantially enriched under conditions which approximate the conditions of actual battle.

It was noted everywhere that the absolute majority of CPSU members and candidate members are accomplishing their party and military duty in a worthy manner and are rallying and leading the personnel to the attainment of new goals in combat improvement. Operating with the forms and methods inherent in them, the party committees and bureaus have begun to examine more deeply the activity of the communists on various sectors, to delve actively into all aspects of the life of unit and ship personnel, and to organize party work more objectively directly in the subunits.

Showing themselves in a good light as the combat organizers of purposeful and effective party work were, for example, the party committees and bureaus of the Nth Missile Unit and Guards tank regiment of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the nuclear submarine where A. Pavlov, M. Pakhomov, and R. Gadyl'shin are members of the party election organs. The party organization of the airborne unit which is accomplishing its international duty in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is known by its good deeds. Here, 80 percent of the communists are experts of combat and political training and more than 80 percent of the party members and candidate members are specialists with an increased proficiency rating. The highest indices in combat training in the named collectives were achieved by the subunits commanded by officer-communists. Thanks to the



personal example and selfless labor of party members and candidates, the party organizations are in fact accomplishing the leading political role and are a genuine nucleus of the troop collectives.

Of course, each party collective being discussed has its own special features in its work. But there is also much that is common and typical of all these organizations. And namely: they are striving to accomplish in full measure the requirements of the 26th Party Congress and the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee plenums, are persistently following the recommendations of the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, and displaying activity, initiative, and devotion to principle in their activity. The party organizations keep specific questions of combat readiness and the strengthening and maintenance of firm military order at the center of attention. In which regard, they solve them in close unity with commanders, their political deputies, and staffs. Persistently implementing the Lenin principles and contemporary requirements of the party for the development of socialist competition, the party organizations instill in the communists and all personnel a high level of responsibility for the accomplishment of obligations which have been assumed and are constantly concerned about the continuous replenishment of the ranks of experts, rated specialists, and masters of military affairs. Party committees and party buros analyze profoundly and make a principled evaluation of each party member's and each candidate member's accomplishment of his party and service duties and personal contribution to the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, or ship. For these purposes, they make wide use of such work forms, which have justified themselves, as party assignments, reports and accounts of communists, and individual talks.

At the same time, meetings and conferences which have taken place have shown that serious shortcomings in party work to support the tasks of combat readiness have not yet been overcome in a number of party organizations and political organs. Effective influence for the high effectiveness of the training process is not being accomplished everywhere. At times, no decisive struggle is waged against simplification and indulgences in combat training, the low level of personal training of individual communists is evaluated uncritically, and other shortcomings are permitted which do not permit attaining higher quality indices in the combat training of subunits and units, especially in tactical, firing and special training.

The participants in the meetings and conferences presented specific examples of a formal attitude of individual party members, candidates, and party organizations towards such questions of great importance as the development of creativity and initiative of servicemen in the mastery of military skill, their involvement in socialist competition, especially for the mastery of weapons and combat equipment, and the quality accomplishment of standards. Also noted was the poor use, by party committees and buros, of political influence to raise the organizing and indoctrinating role of socialist competition, toward which we are oriented by the December (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Many of these shortcomings are inherent, for example, in the party organizations where V. Plakhuta, V. Tukhtin, V. Bystrov, F. Miskin, and others were secretaries. Here party committees and buros, as was noted at party election meetings, did not delve deeply into the state of affairs on the most important sectors of the

combat readiness and training of the personnel, did not make a principled evaluation of facts of indifference and carelessness, and did not make strictly responsible those communists who willingly declared initiatives and promises and assumed lofty obligations but did not display persistence in the attainment of planned goals and were not always demanding toward communists, toward their personal training, and toward the contribution which they make to the matter of maintaining the combat readiness and training of subordinate subunits, units, and ships.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee are orienting military personnel, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations toward the improvement of activity which is directed toward the further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat potential. It is important, it was stressed at the meetings and conferences, to explain to the personnel daily the complete acuteness and explosiveness of the contemporary situation in the world and to show that the interests of the defense of socialism's achievements require of each serviceman now as never before exceptional vigilance, high combat skill, the irreproachable accomplishment of military duty, and the maintenance of organization, discipline, and constant readiness for bold, decisive, and skillful actions in the accomplishment of any order of the motherland. We are speaking of the necessity to explain not only the military significance of these tasks itself, but also their great political significance for the fates of socialism.

Now, when winter combat training is in full swing, it is extremely timely to recall the instruction of the December (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee about the increase in the organizing role of the state plan. The plan for operational, combat, and political training and the lesson schedule--this is also a state plan for the timely, complete, and quality accomplishment of which is a determining condition for the combat readiness and combat capability of the unit, ship, and large unit. Therefore, the most important task of party work is to ensure the accomplishment of the plan of combat training in the established time and with proper quality. Disruption of the plan for combat training and attempts to conduct one or another measure envisioned by it only for the sake of a "tick mark" alone should receive a party evaluation based on principle.

For the movement in combat improvement to be forward, as required by the Soviet minister of defense, more fixed attention should be devoted to those subunits, units, and ships which remain for a long time among the laggards or middle elements and do not gain in their combat improvement for years. The party organizations of such units and ships were discussed at party conferences of the Central Asian, Far East, and North Caucasus Military Districts, the Central Group of Forces, and the Black Sea Fleet. It is necessary that this criticism be followed by practical deeds and that high demands be imposed on the specific persons on whom forward movement depends.

Political organs and party organizations, it was noted in the course of accounts and elections, must have daily and profound knowledge of the status of combat training of units and subunits, adopt measures to eliminate shortcomings in good time jointly with commanders, and make great demands of communists for the organization and quality of combat and political training and for the raising of military-technical knowledge as well as knowledge of party-political work and its forms and methods.

Among the tasks for combat training great significance is attached to the personnel's mastery of organizational weapons and combat equipment, especially new models, and to the accomplishment of the task, "For new equipment--a higher level of its mastery!", assigned by the Soviet minister of defense. Here is a broad field of activity for all party organizations: to constantly be concerned about the propagandizing and introduction of leading experience in the mastery of equipment and weapons; about the training of rated specialists and the raising of qualifications by all categories of servicemen, especially by officers and warrant officers [praporshchik and michman]; about improvement of military-technical propaganda; about the development of the creativity of army innovators and inventors; and about the improvement of the training-material base.

From the thoughts of the communists who spoke at the meetings and conferences, in the struggle for the skillful mastery of weapons and equipment the party organizations of units and ships utilize far from completely the capabilities of Komsomol organizations. This is why military-technical propaganda, and the experience of the senior comrade-communist, and the active work of each Komsomol organization which is directed toward instilling in Komsomol members a love for equipment, developing the striving to know it thoroughly, and employing it skillfully in the accomplishment of training-combat missions are important.

One of the most important sectors of the struggle for high combat readiness is the strengthening of military discipline and prescribed order. The significance of discipline at the contemporary stage of the Armed Forces' development has grown immeasurably. It is precisely this which caused the great attention to questions of strengthening discipline and that broad range of questions on the organizational and indoctrinational work of the party organizations which was analyzed exactly and comprehensively in the course of the accounts and elections. It was noted that party organizations and political organs have intensified attention to the improvement of party-political work directed toward the strengthening of discipline, to searches for ways to improve the organization of moral, military, and legal indoctrination, and to raising the role of the communists in maintaining prescribed order. At the same time, here we also find many unsolved problems. There still are frequent cases where the influence of some party organizations on bringing about strict prescribed order is clearly insufficient. The concern of the communists with such a situation is in keeping with that acuteness with which the party and its Central Committee are now posing questions of strengthening party, state, and labor discipline which have extremely important significance for the accomplishment of all other tasks.

In their activity, party organizations proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the strength of Soviet military discipline is in its conscious nature. Therefore, a most important direction in the activity of party organizations is explaining to the servicemen the provisions of the Soviet constitution, Soviet laws, the oath, and military regulations, raising the quality and effectiveness of political, military, moral, and legal indoctrination of people, and creating a healthy moral climate in the collectives. Political organs and party organizations are called upon to reinforce the high daily demandingness of commanders with concern for the molding of intolerance toward instances of drunkenness, unprescribed mutual relations, and carelessness in service and to see that the communists influence the behavior of the men and their service by word and personal example.



Among the communists, young officers and warrant officers comprise a considerable segment. But some of them, as was acknowledged at the meetings and conferences, are doing far from everything to maintain firm prescribed order in those subunits and on those sectors which they head, and individual comrades do not even provide a personal example in behavior. In this connection, we cannot fail to support those comrades who, in their statements, expressed the thought that each CPSU member and candidate member should be held more strictly responsible for his personal contribution to the matter of strengthening discipline and prescribed order.

And here, as those who spoke expressed their opinion, the role of the party organizations of the subunits which are working in the thick of the masses, which know best of all the local situation, the attitudes of the people, and their demands, and are able to exert their influence on the state of discipline more effectively is especially great. Party committees and buros are called upon to direct these collectives toward the prevention of instances of the violation of prescribed order and amoral phenomena, enrich the communists with leading experience of the struggle for firm military discipline, and hold them strictly responsible for the effectiveness and final results of the work which they are conducting.

The intensification of party influence on all aspects of the life of the troops and naval forces is inseparably linked with the ideological-indoctrinational work of the party organizations. The activity of party organizations, party committees and buros, and political organs in implementing the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on questions of improving ideological and mass-political work was discussed comprehensively at election meetings and party conferences. Such specific sectors as the status of Marxist-Leninist training and political lessons and party and economic education, the participation of communists in agitation and propaganda as well as mass-cultural work, and the connection of ideological-indoctrinational work with life, with the contemporary military-political situation, and with the specific missions being accomplished by subunits, units, and ships, were a subject for detailed examination in many party organizations.

As was noted in the course of accounts and elections, in the party organizations where Comrades A. Bobrakov, V. Shulayev, V. Teplov, and A. Ognevoy are members of the elective organs much is being done so that ideological and mass-political work is structured in accordance with the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the requirements imposed on the Armed Forces by the party. This work is directed toward ensuring the daily explanation of the contemporary military-political situation in the world and the maintenance of high vigilance and the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces on this basis. Here, ideological-indoctrinational measures are closely tied to the tasks facing the units. Party organizations are constantly improving the presentation of agitation and propaganda and are concerned about raising the quality and effectiveness of political and party training and the strengthening of the material-technical base for ideological work. The party committees and buros are attracting all communists to the active participation in the political indoctrination of the men. They are objectively directing the daily activity of agitation-propaganda groups, political information specialists, and agitators.

Unfortunately this is the situation in far from all party organizations. At the meetings and conferences it was noted, for example, that questions of ideological-indoctrinational work in the life of individual party organizations have still not occupied the place which becomes them. At party meetings and sessions of party committees and party buros, the conversation still rarely turns to how the communists are working on the ideological sectors assigned to them, and at times a principled evaluation is not given to cases of the low quality and insufficient effectiveness of measures being conducted and the ideological passivity of some party members and candidate members. In some places, the old adherence to an evaluation of the status of ideological work in accordance with the number of measures conducted is manifested.

In the decisions of the meetings and conferences it was again confirmed that the core of ideological and political-indoctrinational work was and remains the molding of a scientific world outlook and boundless devotion to the cause of the party and communist ideals in the Soviet servicemen. The profound study and assimilation of the Lenin ideological-theoretical heritage and the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the plenums of its Central Committee by communists and all servicemen should be at the center of attention of all this work. The most important task of the political organs and party organizations is, first of all, concern for the ideological tempering of party members and candidates, raising the effectiveness of political and party training, and improving the selection, training, and indoctrination of propaganda personnel.

At the election meetings and conferences the communists discussed the necessity to increase the urgency of propaganda and agitation and their aggressiveness and operativeness and to intensify the influence of ideological work on the attainment of the best final results. In this connection, they proposed that in the conduct of ideological measures the party committees and party buros consider more completely the special features of various categories of servicemen, their increased demands, and the specific processes which occur in the troop collectives, propagandize widely examples of the exemplary performance of service and party duty, and conduct an active offensive against the antipodes of communist morals, violators of discipline, instances of unprescribed mutual relations, and other antisocial phenomena. At meetings and conferences, great attention has been devoted to the further improvement of the heroic-patriotic indoctrination of the personnel in connection with the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War. Veterans of the war and labor and the Armed Forces should be attracted to this work more actively.

The party organizations have large forces which are capable of accomplishing the tasks of ideological work put forth by the party. Now, as the accounts and elections have shown, from 50 to 70 percent of the communists in each party organization are accomplishing party assignments of an ideological nature. The task is for these forces to organize better and persistently improve methods of party leadership of the various sectors of the ideological life of the troop collectives of subunits, units, and ships. Here, an important role is played by the personal example of the communists-leaders--people who have the highest theoretical training and possess the greatest party, military, and life's experience.

A necessary condition for increasing the effectiveness of party work and intensifying its influence on the increased tasks facing the troops and naval forces is a further rise in the role of the primary party organizations as the political nucleus of the troop collectives and the center of daily ideological-indoctrinational activity and its consistent improvement in the spirit of the lines of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee. Purposefulness, the ability to concentrate efforts on the accomplishment of the key tasks of combat readiness, and the striving to rely more broadly on the collective experience of the communists and the ramified network of party organizations in subunits, units, and on ships and in the command elements have become characteristic of the work of many committees, buros, and political organs and attention to checking the execution of decisions adopted by the party has been raised. It is precisely these features which are inherent in the work of the party committees and buros as members of which Majors Yu. Troitskiy, I. Sibov, and A. Kashkarov, Captain Yu. Semenov, and Captain-Lieutenant A. Vitsko are working. Here party influence on the accomplishment of tasks for combat improvement is constantly increasing. The party organizations are using all means of ideological and organizational work skillfully for this, are involving in it all communists without exception, and are exerting political influence on each serviceman.

V. I. Lenin's instruction that "it is not enough to call ourselves the 'vanguard,' the forward detachment--we should also operate so that all the other detachments see and are forced to acknowledge that we are going in advance," sounds timely even today. The necessity constantly to be concerned about the vanguard role of the communists was discussed at the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations which examined urgent questions of the further increase in the activity, initiative, and devotion to principle in the work of party organizations as an inherent condition for the actual accomplishment of their leading political role in the life of the collective.

What has been said acquires special significance in the activity of party organizations of headquarters, control elements, departments of military-educational institutions, and scientific research institutions. As is known, they exert many-faceted influence on various aspects of the military organizational development and training of the troops, and personnel who are theoretically well trained are concentrated here. It is a task of great importance to make more complete use of their knowledge and comprehensive experience in the development of military thought and military art and the accomplishment of the key tasks of the combat readiness and training of the troops and naval forces. It is precisely toward this that we are oriented by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on the work of the party committee of the Ministry of Railways in the development of initiative and raising the responsibility of the apparatus' communists for the accomplishment of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee.

Problems in the further ensuring of the vanguard role of communists in service and training were discussed widely at the meetings and conferences which took place and specific figures were mentioned which reflect the number of experts and rated specialists in the units and on the ships. Those party members and candidates who do not set the tone in combat and political training and in the struggle for prescribed order were subjected to sharp criticism. Holding the



communists strictly responsible is the sign of mature intra-party relations in the collective and of the high demandingness which is in keeping with the demandingness which the party always imposed on its members. This is first of all--to raise one's ideological-theoretical level continuously, to occupy an active life's position in everything, and to be morally irreproachable. In the course of the accounts and elections, an exacting talk took place on the impermissibility of the narrow, debased understanding of the role of the communist's personal example which is current in some places: work well yourself, do not violate military discipline--and this is fully enough. But is it enough? Especially for the party member or candidate member--officer or warrant officer. For usually standing behind him is the subunit and unit, that is, a specific sector for the state of affairs on which, and for the maintenance of high combat readiness by all the men, he bears party and service responsibility. The comrades who spoke saw in such a more complete approach to an evaluation of the communist's personal example a great possibility for the further increase in the personal contribution of each party member and candidate to the common success and for the intensification of party influence on the leading sectors of combat readiness, training, and service as a whole.

A prominent place at the meetings and conferences was occupied by the discussion of questions of leadership of the Komsomol organizations and the training and indoctrination of the newly elected activists, and the responsibility of the communists who are working in the Komsomol election organs was stressed. The unanimous opinion was expressed that party organs are required to make a profound analysis of the life of the youth collectives, to consider their special features more completely, and to direct the work of the Komsomol organizations daily toward ensuring the exemplary nature of the Komsomols in service, training, and discipline. Now, noted those who spoke, it is necessary to help the Komsomol organs to mobilize the Komsomol members and young servicemen for a worthy greeting for the Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations.

The decree, "On the work of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party on improving the style and methods of the activity of the party organizations in light of the decisions of the November (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee," which was recently adopted by the CPSU Central Committee stresses the necessity to improve the style and methods of organizational and political work in implementing the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee with great persistence. What is meant here first of all? It is to raise the effectiveness of party leadership, develop and consolidate in the activity of party organs, all leader personnel, and the party activists a creative, scientific approach to the solution of problems which arise, genuinely Leninist efficiency, party devotion to principle, self-criticism, and personal responsibility, to influence the attitudes of people actively, and to intensify even further work on strengthening state, planning, and labor discipline and order and organization on all sectors. Everything stated above also has basic significance for the practical activity of the party committees and buros of units, ships, and political organs.

The work style of party organizations and their leading elective organs should reliably guarantee the strict observance of the Lenin standards of party life,

the further development of intra-party democracy, criticism and self-criticism, the initiative and responsibility of the communists, their active participation in the generation and realization of decisions, and the quality replenishment of the ranks of the CPSU.

In improving the methods of party leadership, it should be stressed once more that the main thing in leadership is not the conduct of sessions and the adoption of numerous decisions. The living organization of a matter and the systematic and effective monitoring of the accomplishment of the party's decisions and the orders and directives of the Soviet minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy should in fact become the main content of the daily activity of party committees and buros, and of the work of political organs, their apparatus, and all elective activists. It is important to be concerned for the timely and persistent implementation of critical remarks and suggestions expressed by communists in the course of accounts and elections. For the profound interest of party members and candidate members in improving combat training and the indoctrination of the personnel is expressed in them.

The elective party organs--party committees, buros, and commissions--have been substantially strengthened as a result of the accounts and elections. Eighty-two percent of the regimental commanders and 1st- and 2d-rank ship commanders, about 40 percent of the staff officers, engineers, and technicians, and more than 10 percent of the political officers were elected as members of them. More than 65 percent of the secretaries of primary party organizations have a higher education and 37 percent of the secretaries have been elected for the second time or more. The matter is to organize the leadership of the party activists. A role of no small importance will also be played by the ability of one-man commanders to rely on the party organizations and direct their activity.

The political organs of all elements approached the organization of the instruction of the newly elected activists and members and candidate members of party commissions with great responsibility and are rendering them objective assistance in work. For example, assemblies of party activists in the Moscow, Baltic, and Leningrad Military Districts and the Moscow Air Defense District proceeded instructively. In implementing the leadership of party organizations, political organs are called upon to consider the specific character of each of them more concretely, including the units of the various combat arms, staffs and headquarters, military-educational institutions, military commissariats, institutions, and enterprises.

The activity of the newly elected party commissions should be developed even farther in checking the communists' accomplishment of the duties envisaged by the CPSU Regulation and their observance of party, state, and military discipline, the connection between party commissions and the primary party organizations should be strengthened, and their role in raising the responsibility of CPSU members and candidate members for implementation of the party's requirements for the motherland's armed defenders should be increased.

The accounts and elections of the party organs are behind us. The tasks are understood even more profoundly and specific decisions have been adopted.

Great and important work has been initiated in carrying out these decisions. Everything should be done so that the all ideological life and intra-party relations in the party organization; further even more and in every possible way the subsequent strengthening of their influence among the masses, their implementation of the role of leading political force of the troop collectives, and the successful accomplishment of the missions assigned to the Armed Forces by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet minister of defense.

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### IMPORTANCE OF MARXISM-LENINISM TO MILITARY WORLD VIEWPOINT

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[Article by Col A. Dmitriyev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor:  
"Knowledge of War and Peace in the System of a Scientific World Outlook";  
passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Life teaches: the more difficult and important the tasks being accomplished, the more strained the situation in which one must act, and the more acute the ideological struggle, the greater is the role played by the nature of the world outlook, the consistency of the ideological position, and the moral foundation of the personality.

The large-scale tasks put forth by the 26th Congress of the CPSU and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee are directing the Soviet people toward the systematic, comprehensive improvement of developed socialism and the firm defense of its achievements. In the accomplishment of these tasks a special, responsible role belongs to the Soviet Armed Forces. Under conditions of the sharply aggravated international situation and the frank military provocations of the imperialist circles of the United States and NATO, the Soviet Armed Forces step forth as the reliable guards of the Soviet people's creative labor and the main weapon for the defense of socialist achievements. The Soviet servicemen are performing their difficult service in constant readiness to stop imperialism's aggressive onslaughts. The fervent feeling of love for the motherland, devotion to the great party of Lenin, and loyalty to the ideas of proletarian, socialist internationalism stimulate them to accomplish all missions in the best manner.

A Marxist-Leninist world outlook comprises the basis of these lofty ideas, feelings, and attitudes and the entire process of communist indoctrination. In stressing it the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee thereby called it one of the most important directions of the party's ideological and mass-political work at the contemporary stage. For the process of the molding of a scientific world outlook in the Soviet servicemen to be purposeful and fruitful, our military personnel should have a clear notion of its structure and basic components and the place which knowledge of peace, war, the army, and questions of the military policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state occupy among them.

A world outlook, as is noted in Marxist-Leninist literature, is a system of generalized views on the objective world and man's place in it, on the relation of man to the reality which surrounds him and to himself, and on the social ideal



and ways for its attainment. A world outlook is generated by all forms of social consciousness; therefore, it can be defined as the totality of philosophical, legal, moral, religious (atheistic) and aesthetic ideas and convictions of people which exert a specific influence on their activity. These ideas and convictions can be scientific or unscientific, express the interests of the working classes or exploiters, and have a systems or non-systems nature.

The communist, Marxist-Leninist world outlook steps forth as the highest and most developed form. First of all, it is an integral and harmonious system of constantly developing scientific knowledge of reality. At the same time, it is not only knowledge, but also a specific relationship toward reality and its evaluation from the position of the working class, the laboring masses, and the Marxist-Leninist party. Finally, a communist world outlook steps forth as a creative, active force which lifts up the masses for the struggle for the revolutionary renewal of the world and for the building of socialism and communism. Thus, a genuine scientific character, open party spirit, and revolutionary reality--these are the main features of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook which are inseparable from one another, the consideration of which is necessary in all work of indoctrination and self-education.

It is also necessary to stress that the molding of a communist world outlook enters into the struggle against anti-scientific, reactionary views. At the June (1983) plenum of our party's Central Committee, it was stressed that the historic period which mankind is going through is marked by the antagonism of two opposite world outlooks unprecedented in its intensity and acuteness, of two political courses--socialism and imperialism. A struggle is under way for the minds and hearts of billions of people on the planet. And the future of mankind depends in no small degree on the outcome of this ideological struggle.

Similar to a complex architectural structure, a world outlook has its own foundation, framework, number of stories, and superstructure. Each of its components is necessary and important and acts in its own way on the process of indoctrinating the Soviet servicemen.

The foundation, the basis of a communist world outlook is formed by Marxism-Leninism as a single system of philosophical, economic, and political knowledge. It permits understanding and evaluating social processes from genuinely scientific positions and arms with a class, revolutionary point of view. The entire content of the theory of the proletarian party, noted F. Engels, arose on the basis of political economy (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 13, p 490). The theory of scientific communism, which teaches not only how to struggle for a new life and build socialism and communism but also how to defend its achievements became its highest achievement.

Other fields of knowledge also participate in the molding of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook--all forms of social consciousness and the corresponding social sciences as well as the most basic natural-technical and logic-mathematical sciences. We note that the content of a world outlook is formed not by all this knowledge in its full volume (for in this case not one person could claim that he possesses a scientific world outlook), but only by the main generalized conclusions which help to comprise an integral view of the world. However, the

striving to master this knowledge and expand one's horizon is a necessary condition for the molding of a scientific world outlook. "You can only become a communist," V. I. Lenin indicated, "when you enrich your memory with the knowledge of all those riches which mankind has generated" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 305).

The philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism is the nucleus of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook. It forms the initial position--the materialistic and dialectical point of view of the world. Materialism and dialectics permit military personnel to evaluate military affairs objectively and specifically in their ties and contradictions and help to understand which factors determine their development and how they do it.

The program provisions which were basically formulated at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee encompass all component parts of Marxism-Leninism. They permit determining precisely the stage of social development in which we find ourselves, disclose the key tasks in the fields of economics and social policy and the improvement of the political and ideological superstructure and the spiritual life of society, and characterize the most important directions of the CPSU's international activity and the questions of the country's defense and the defense of socialism's achievements. These provisions comprise the main content of the world outlook of each communist and of all Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces. They help to evaluate correctly the sources of the socialist state's defensive might, determine the basic elements of the defense potential, and to seek effective ways to raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

However, when we are discussing the world outlook of military personnel and of all Soviet servicemen, it is necessary to distinguish especially that totality of knowledge which is tied especially closely with the type of their activity and helps them to generate correct notions on those questions which pertain to the foundations and meaning of this activity. This is knowledge of war and peace, of the army and the development of military affairs, and of the military policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. It is contained in Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Knowledge of this type is also provided by socialist military science, military history, political and legal theory, and so forth in their military-applied content.

Two groups of problems can be distinguished in knowledge of peace, war, and the army, the content of which has decisive significance for the molding of the world outlook of military personnel. The first group is formed by the most general problems: what are the nature and essence of war and peace and their role in historic development; how should the types of wars and forms of peace be distinguished in accordance with their social nature; how should the essence of nuclear war be evaluated, and so forth. The other group is made up of problems of practical politics: what are the specific ways to prevent aggressive wars and strengthen peace under contemporary conditions; how to stop the arms race and achieve their reduction and, in the long term, total disarmament; how to ensure the reliable defense of socialist achievements under the conditions of the contemporary dangerous course of the imperialist forces of reaction and war.

The world-outlook problems of the first group contain the initial aims. As the classics of Marxism-Leninism have shown, a world outlook can be neither integral nor correct if the class, political nature of war and peace are not understood, if the relationship of war and revolution and the role of war and peace in history are not cleared up, and if the relation to various wars and forms of peace on the part of the working class and its party are not worked out. It is precisely on these questions that an acute ideological struggle has been under way for many decades in the first place.

The Marxist-Leninist viewpoint is countered by bourgeois and revisionist concepts in which are preached frank militarism, and abstract bourgeois pacifism, and frankly class, imperialist views, and allegedly a non-class, humanitarian but in fact pro-bourgeois approach to the problems of war and peace.

The ideologists and politicians of militarism, and first of all of the United States of America, persistently assert that war is a perpetual and inevitable phenomenon and that military violence was and remains the decisive factor of history. Peace, in their opinion, cannot be either prolonged or universal: it is always only an interval between wars and a condition for the regrouping of forces and preparation for a new war. Now the most undisguised and cynically militaristic course is being conducted by official Washington. An exhaustive evaluation of it was given in the speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, at the special February plenum of our party's Central Committee.

The views of militarism's ideologists on nuclear weapons and nuclear war are most dangerous. They are trying to instill in people the thought that nuclear war is not only possible, but also completely feasible as one of the means for the solution of international problems. Moreover, they are counting on victory in such a war and are endeavoring to achieve military superiority over the countries of the socialist commonwealth in the name of this and are "justifying" the necessity for the employment of nuclear weapons first. Imperialism's strategists are seriously elaborating and propagandizing the concepts of a "limited nuclear war," "first disarming strike," "protracted nuclear war," and so forth.

Bourgeois pacifism occupies positions externally opposite to militarism. Some revisionists in the communist movement also criticize militarism. However, these positions are inconsistent, and the criticism usually turns against revolutionary movements. Pacifists come out against any war and, consequently, against a revolutionary, liberation war. They fight for any peace, including colonialist, antidemocratic peace. The bourgeois pacifists are not waging a struggle against militarism, do not see the real forces capable of restraining it, and at times objectively further the strengthening of its positions. The revisionists often slip down to the viewpoint of abstract pacifism and usually join with those who support the lie of a "Soviet military threat" and who put forth the thesis of "equal responsibility" of the USSR and the United States for the curtailment of detente and the increase in the danger of war.

Marxism-Leninism provides a scientific solution for these problems. Its conclusions also comprise those world-outlook lines which guide military personnel and all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces and the fraternal socialist armies.



Marxism-Leninism teaches that both peace and war are complex, contradictory phenomena which have a class-political nature and play different roles in history.

The Lenin definition of the essence of war exerts a most profound influence on the world outlook of servicemen. V.I. Lenin required looking at each war as the "CONTINUATION" of the politics of given, interested powers--and of VARIOUS CLASSES within them--at a given time" ("Polnoye sobraniye socheniniy," Vol 26, p 224). This proposition tears from war the cloak of secrecy and mysticism with which bourgeois ideologists wrap it. War is not "God's punishment for sins," not a form of "mass psychosis," not the manifestation of the "instinct of aggressiveness," not the "automatic result" of scientific-technical progress, and so forth. War is a continuation of the politics of classes and states by means of armed violence and is used as a weapon of politics. This is its general, deep-seated essence which is preserved as long as wars in general exist.

The Lenin approach also permits the correct understanding of the essence of nuclear war if it is unleashed by imperialism. In bourgeois and revisionist literature voices continue to be heard to the effect that such a war cannot be considered as a continuation of politics and its weapon. Several Marxist authors also display inconsistency in this question. Meanwhile, any inconsistency here only confuses the state of affairs and harms the cause of peace. In preparing a nuclear war, the hawks of imperialism are not opposed to lifting responsibility from themselves and putting forth such a war as a non-political phenomenon and as a world catastrophe which may occur, so to say, despite their "peace-loving" aspirations.

The correct approach is to distinguish the question of the nature and essence of nuclear war from the question of its possible consequences and of its effectiveness as a tool of politics. A nuclear world war is being prepared and may be unleashed by imperialism's most reactionary forces. In this sense, it would be nothing different from a continuation of their aggressive policy and its weapon. But today, one cannot fail to see that such a war cannot be an effective tool for an aggressive policy. It will not bring those results on which the strategists of imperialism are counting and its consequences will be catastrophic for all people on Earth. This is why a nuclear war cannot be permitted--neither small nor large, neither limited nor total.

In the formation of a world outlook an important role is played by the criteria for distinguishing just and unjust wars. Marxist-Leninists see "two wars" in each war and evaluate their nature depending on which policy gave rise to it and who is waging it, why, and in the name of what. A war may be unjust on both sides (such, for example, are all wars between imperialist plunderers). But more often, it resolves contradictions between polar social forces and, therefore, proves to be just from one aspect and unjust from another. Bourgeois and revisionist ideologists often agree in that they deny the applicability of such a division to nuclear war. However, there cannot be two opinions on this question. Prepared and unleashed by imperialism, such a war on its part, unquestionably, would have an extremely reactionary, unjust nature. On the contrary, on the part of socialism which is forced to employ responsive actions it would be just in its nature and directed toward the defense of its achievements and the defense of the freedom and independence of peoples.

Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace and international detente, our state has assumed the unilateral obligation not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. The adoption of such an obligation under conditions of unceasing military preparations by the United States and its allies objectively imposes rigid requirements for the further raising of our Armed Forces' combat readiness, their technical equipping, improvement of control and communication, and strengthening of the men's moral-political tempering. "It is necessary," stresses the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "that the influence of the factor of surprise be reduced to the minimum and that the aggressor does not have the temptation to be the first to employ nuclear weapons with impunity. The highest combat readiness of all the services and combat arms of the Soviet Armed Forces and the excellent combat training and military skill of each serviceman are the guarantee of our motherland's security and the reliable defense of all countries of the socialist commonwealth."

The content of a scientific world outlook also includes the Marxist-Leninist class-political evaluation of peace.

Imperialist peace is unjust in its very essence. It is a peace where the class and national oppression of countries and peoples is considered to be a law. It includes predatory wars and itself is their fruit. V. I. Lenin wrote: "Imperialist war...can lead only to imperialist peace, that is, to the strengthening, expansion, and intensification of the oppression of weak nations and countries by finance capital..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 27, p 282).

Imperialism of the start of the 20th Century interpreted peace as a system of the domination of some countries by others, of mother countries over colonies. For the fascists, peace signified the establishment of a "new order" in Europe and the enslavement of Slavic and other peoples. The ruling circles of the United States see "peace American style" in the establishment of their global domination and the change in the socio-political system in other countries according to the American model. A reactionary role is also played by the so-called concept of "limited war" which would permit the imperialists to unleash local wars and accomplish interventions, interfering in the affairs of other states and peoples.

The CPSU and fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties have worked out and are actively putting into practice the concept of a just, democratic peace. Under the specific historical conditions of the contemporary era its political and legal basis is comprised of the principles of peaceful coexistence which were proclaimed by V.I. Lenin. It found its further development in party and state documents and in the Soviet constitution.

The most developed form of a just, democratic peace is the system of relations which is being formed between the countries of socialism and, first of all, by the countries of the socialist commonwealth. They are relations of friendship and collaboration and of comradely mutual assistance which are developing on the principle of socialist internationalism.

The preservation, strengthening, and development of peace require the active struggle for it and the decisive suppression of imperialism's aggressive actions

and its encroachments on the unity and integrity of the socialist commonwealth. In this connection, it is important to stress the tremendous world-outlook significance of the Lenin theory of the socialist fatherland's armed defense.

"Any revolution," V.I. Lenin pointed out, "is worth something only if it is able to defend itself..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 37, p 122). Imperialism will not surrender its positions voluntarily and will strive with all its strength to eliminate the outpost of the new socio-economic formation. For this purpose, imperialism's bosses are trying to intensify economic, political, and military pressure on the USSR and the socialist commonwealth and are conducting preparations for war.

Under these conditions, the military personnel of the socialist countries are being guided in all their activity by the Lenin theses: on the objective necessity for the armed defense of socialism's achievements; on the legality and justice of wars in the defense of the socialist fatherland; on the international nature of the defense of socialist achievements; on the necessity to strengthen the defensive capability of a socialist state; on the importance of high vigilance and constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces for the repulse of imperialist aggression; and on the decisive role of the Communist Party in the matter of directing military organizational development and the defense of socialist achievements.

Such are the most important general-theoretical problems of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and peace which exert a profound influence on the world outlook of the Soviet servicemen and their brothers in arms in the socialist countries. It is necessary to stress, however, that a world outlook is developed and defined concretely under the constant influence of practical politics and of that knowledge which is the direct reflection of contemporary events and the struggle of two political courses in the world arena.

The nature of the contemporary military-political situation and facts which confirm the aggressiveness of the policy of the United States and its NATO allies exert an active influence on a world outlook.

The logic of the development of the international situation at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's showed that imperialism did not withstand the test of detente. Falsifying facts and assuring that allegedly detente is a "one-way street" and that it brings advantages only to the USSR and the socialist countries, imperialism openly set out on the path of anti-detente, intentionally aggravating the already difficult situation. This line was especially intensified with the coming of the Reagan administration to power in the United States.

The increase in military preparations and dangerous steps toward the unleashing of a world war are the most characteristic expression of the "crusade" against socialism which it has declared. The doctrine of "direct confrontation" serves as the concentrated expression of this reckless policy. In the channel of this doctrine the course has been set for the attainment of absolute military superiority over the USSR, for an unrestrained arms race, and for the expansion of existing and the creation of new imperialist military blocs.



The scale of the military preparations being accomplished by the United States is shown by the tremendous military expenditures which are not justified by any reasonable defense requirements. During the last three years alone, such expenditures exceeded 640 billion dollars and in 1985-1989, as has been declared, they will comprise 2 trillion dollars or almost as much as was expended for these purposes during the last 35 years.

The militaristic course of the United States and its allies is manifested not only in the arms race, but also in direct aggressive military actions. Imperialism has set forth on the course of the open exporting of counterrevolution, overthrowing governments which are objectionable to it, and installing reactionary regimes in a number of countries. Used for these purposes are the naval armadas of the United States and Great Britain, other armed services, and special troops -- "rapid deployment forces," mercenary bands, and troops of puppet regimes. Examples of openly aggressive military actions only recently are U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf, Israeli and then the American invasion of Lebanon, Britain's military operations on the Falkland Islands, U.S. intervention in Grenada, the aggression of the Republic of South Africa against Angola, and the conduct of undeclared wars against the peoples of Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

All these facts inexorably lead to a single conclusion and confirm the fundamental Marxist-Leninist evaluation: imperialism is the permanent source of wars and military danger; the threat to peace arises from it and, in the end, only from it; the reactionary circles of the United States and NATO bear full responsibility for the curtailment of detente and for a new round of the arms race as well as for an increase in the danger of war. This evaluation determines and orients the world outlook of our military personnel, directing them toward the accomplishment of specific tasks of strengthening the country's defensive potential and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Imperialism's aggressive actions are being resolutely opposed by the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The ideas, lines, and practical actions which characterize the military policy of the CPSU are exerting a most profound influence on the world-outlook positions of officer personnel and all personnel of the Armed Forces.

The Soviet state is opposing the adventuristic course of the United States and its allies by the consistent struggle to preserve and strengthen peace. As is known, this is not an easy task: peace has a great number of friends, but also many enemies. V.I. Lenin said in this regard: "One who thought that it is easy to attain peace, that it is only necessary to mention peace and the bourgeoisie will bring it to us on a platter, is quite a naive person" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 35, p 116).

The prevention of an aggressive war and the preservation and strengthening of peace are being attained by our state by all means of economic, trade, and cultural policy, diplomatic efforts, and actions in the channel of the Program of Peace for the 80's which was worked out at the 26th CPSU Congress. However, this task also has a military aspect and is being accomplished by means of military policy. They include: stopping the arms race being whipped up by imperialism; maintaining the military-strategic balance; reducing the level of military confrontation, that is, reducing nuclear and conventional armaments and armed forces; and working out and adopting necessary confidence measures in the military field.



In accomplishing these tasks the CPSU and the Soviet state are proposing specific measures and doing everything to put them into practice. It can be said with confidence: not one state has done as much to preserve and strengthen peace as our country. During the postwar period, the USSR put forth more than 100 specific proposals. Only one thing is necessary to carry out these proposals--the readiness of the United States and its allies to approach this problem just as concretely and realistically. However, recent events tell us the opposite, and this forces the USSR to adopt the appropriate measures.

The essence of these measures was defined briefly by the Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov: "The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government consider it their sacred duty to the Soviet people to maintain the country's defensive capability and the Armed Forces' combat readiness constantly at a level which reliably guarantees its peaceful labor and the security of the peoples of the socialist commonwealth's states. And the more serious the threat to the security of the socialist motherland, the higher should our defensive capability be."

The ideas and aims put forth by the party and its practical actions which are directed toward ensuring the security of the USSR and the socialist commonwealth are perceived by military personnel and all personnel of the Armed Forces as a program of specific actions for the performance of their military duty. They attach the necessary purposefulness and activity to the men's world outlook. Rallied around the Communist Party, the men of the Soviet Armed Forces are persistently mastering military equipment, improving combat skill, strengthening discipline and organization, and raising the combat readiness of their units, ships, and subunits in the name of the great cause of preserving peace and the reliable defense of the socialist fatherland.

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### OUTSTANDING POLITICAL OFFICER PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Bogdanovskiy: "Foremost Army and Navy People: The Main Line"]

[Text] I often am in the office of Gds Lt Col A. Gundar', political department chief of the Zaporozhye Guards Tank Division, and each time I sense the intensity of the workday. Now and then the telephones ring, people drop in on the most varied matters. He has everything figured to the minute, and it seems that you came at an inopportune time.

And so on my next arrival we hadn't yet exchanged two or three sentences when the telephone rang. A. I. Shustanov, director of a local school, thanked the political department chief for organizing a children's sports circle and hinted as if in passing:

"Aleksandr Andreyevich, spring is late, it has even gotten colder, and almost no coal is left in the boiler room."

"Don't worry, Avgust Ivanovich," said Gundar', smiling at something to himself, perhaps pleased by the director's persistence, or perhaps their thoughts coincided. "I too am watching the weather. We won't leave the children without heat."

Another note was crowded onto a calendar page covered with entries: "Talk with deputy for rear. Coal. School. Urgent!"

"And now we'll have a talk," I thought. At that very second the phone rang again. The division commander was asking that some matter involving work of the political department personnel in one of the regiments be clarified.

...Instances of an infraction of military discipline have become more frequent of late in the regiment, especially in the battalion commanded by Gds Maj V. Kravchenko. At a conference in the political department everyone arrived at the opinion that the reasons had to be thoroughly studied. Each person was given a specific avenue of work which allowed delving into the essence of the matter thoroughly and comprehensively.

It was learned as a result, for example, that some officers were not always fulfilling regulation duties precisely, that their work style needed improvement, and that their participation in the political indoctrination of personnel had to be reinforced...

The political department officers worked hard to delve into all fine points of the problem, but it was that meticulousness that gave them an opportunity to draw up clear, precise recommendations for the party organization and the regiment's party-political staff. The recommendations were discussed at an expanded party committee session. As always, the political department chief tries to do everything with reliance on the collective and with consideration of the party members' opinion.

While thoroughly considering the individuality of each person with whom he has to work and knowing how to be accessible and friendly, Aleksandr Andreyevich is unbendingly firm if the matter concerns infractions of military discipline, party ethics or abuses of official position. "Here we have to have one line and one yardstick--a party one," he says.

In the very same manner, trying to ensure that each party organization is a creative, searching collective, he strives for that same uniform line in the important matter of an active implementation of party policy. He tries to assure that every party organization is in fact a fighting cell of the party, a political nucleus of the military collective, a center of daily ideological indoctrination work; that every party member is an example in service and in everyday life and that he displays himself actively as an ideological fighter of the party; and that all efforts are directed toward developing the soldiers' acute sense of the forward edge and vigilance regarding imperialism's intrigues, and toward strengthening discipline and combat readiness.

While talking with political department officers Yu. Yevglevskiy, A. Panasenko, V. Gavrilov and others and with unit and subunit party members in these days, he constantly refers to materials of the February and April 1984 CPSU Central Committee plenums and to speeches by Comrade K. U. Chernenko. It is necessary for everyone to have a deep feeling and realization of the problems which the party is advancing to the foreground today.

...After giving a thorough response to the division commander (as I was able to understand, matters would be corrected in the regiment), Gundar' glanced at his watch and later when we were talking he would take a look at it now and then. "Are you in a hurry?" I asked him. "I promised to meet with officers of one of the subunits," he answered and made a helpless gesture as if in apology, indicating that nothing could be done about it. I understand Aleksandr Andreyevich well; his time is extremely filled. The fact is that in addition to the numerous official duties he also has to resolve unexpected "narrative problems" which life presents now and then. His word has to be backed up by actions--this is the law for Gds Lt Col Gundar'.

## ARMED FORCES

### IMPROVING DISCIPLINE AMONG OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 84 pp 45-49

[Article by Col S. Kharin: "It Depends on the Commander"]

[Text] Each time has its signs. Ours, of course, too. One of them was predetermined by the decisions of the 26th Congress of the Leninist party and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and is visibly manifested in the intensification of the struggle to strengthen discipline, organization, and order.

This is clearly traced, for example in the tank regiment which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Chernov. The command, party and Komsomol organizations, and the entire troop collective are consolidating strong, conscious discipline, clear organization, and firm prescribed order in the unit by joint efforts. And here much depends on the regimental commander and his ability to rely on the force of public opinion and on his closest assistants. In analyzing the work style of officer Chernov, you automatically recall Lenin's words: "The leader-communist should demonstrate his right to leadership by the fact, and only by the fact, that he finds many, more and more assistants for himself...and is able to help them work, to advance them, and to show and consider their experience."

In the struggle to strengthen discipline, the commander is actively supported by the officers, communists and Komsomols, and the troop collective. And this is explained first of all by the fact that Vladimir Petrovich is close to people, listens to their opinion and proposals, combines demandingness toward subordinates with concern for them, and foresees the indoctrinational return from his decisions and actions. The commander also gained the respect and, we are not afraid of a lofty word, the love of the tankmen because he never, as they say, speaks in an abrupt style and tries to discern what is favorable in a person and to involve the public in assisting those who have stumbled. I will present a typical example.

During the first days in his post Senior Lieutenant A. Khamaganov worked in a slipshod manner and did not occupy himself with the indoctrination of subordinates. Cases of violations of military discipline became more frequent in the subunit. The young officer's immediate superior, considering that he had exhausted all means of administrative influence, turned to the unit commander with the request that Khamaganov be strictly punished on his authority.



"It is easy to punish," said Lieutenant Colonel Chernov. "And really, there is still time for it. I believe that thus far we, the party organization and our public opinion, have used far from all measures of conviction and indoctrinational possibilities."

Communist Khamaganov's account was soon heard at the party buro. As he himself admitted at the session, he did not expect such sharp criticism and, simultaneously comradely interest. He assumed that the activists would chide him and, looking into the situation, would limit themselves to this for the first time. They really did look into the situation, but they did not begin to make allowances and held him accountable with all severity. He understood: there would be no easy time from his fellow servicemen henceforth.

From that time, the secretary of the party organization and other activists devoted more attention to the communist's work style and helped him to correct errors and blunders. The battalion commander intensified the monitoring of his subordinate's service activity. Of course, the young officer did not change his attitude toward service at once, and the path of its correction was not simple and not easy. But the main turning point had already occurred, and it occurred to a significant degree thanks to the atmosphere of exactingness which had become firmly established in the party organization as well as in the regiment's officer collective.

Khamaganov joined in social work and began to study more objectively the art of leadership of the activity of the subunit's activists to which he formerly did not devote proper attention. The officer gradually made it a rule to discuss with the Komsomol activists how better to prevent breakdowns in the behavior of some men. The activists understood very quickly that the commander sees in them his assistants and support. Khamaganov also felt a change in the people's attitude. It was manifested in the fact that many sergeants and soldiers supported his demands and held strictly responsible those who permit themselves to deviate from the requirements of the regulations.

The situation in the subunit's collective changed noticeably for the better with time. And in the regiment, they no longer recall the difficult development of the young officer and the errors which he committed.

There is a story which is so commonplace at first glance. But let us trace the logic of the commander's decision. Of course, Lieutenant Colonel Chernov knew that the force of public opinion and the sincere participation of the comrades in the party organization can play their role in the fate of Senior Lieutenant Khamaganov. And he did not make a mistake in counting on it.

Nor can we fail to note the following. The regimental commander taught a lesson in benevolent form to the young officer's immediate superior that one cannot set hopes exclusively on disciplinary punishment. Tactfully and unobtrusively, he showed convincingly the force of public influence on a person. It is not by chance that subsequently both the battalion commander and Senior Lieutenant Khamaganov began to rely on the public in the accomplishment of indoctrinational tasks.

The party organization is the regimental commander's reliable assistant in indoctrinational work. Being a member of the party buro, Lieutenant Colonel Chernov constantly consults with the communists on the most important questions of the collective's life and brings up the most burning of them for discussion by the party collective.

One day, in discussing the agenda for the next meeting on the vanguard role of the communists in socialist competition with the secretary of the party buro, Major O. Sharshakov, the regimental commander asked:

"Oleg Abramovich, what most disturbed the people at yesterday's question and answer soiree?"

"The equipment and its readiness to go out to the field, and we thought that the main questions would concern living conditions and the operation of the rear services...."

"It is completely proper that prior to the forthcoming tactical exercise they are anxious about the main thing. For if we look at the root of the matter, then instances of disruption of the schedule for planned prescribed maintenance work, and the separation of the personnel from it, and the lack of supply with everything necessary for high-quality preparation of the equipment--all this is a consequence of the carelessness of individual officials and deviation from established order. And they are all communists who assumed specific obligations directed toward the excellent accomplishment of tasks. So, perhaps, isn't it expedient to talk precisely about this at the meeting and correct the agenda?"

The commander gave a report at the party meeting. He sharply posed the question that the example of the communist should be displayed in the unity of word and deed and the irreproachable execution of plans for the preparation of the specialists and equipment for the exercise. He mentioned by name those who did not cope with the assigned matter and forgot about socialist obligations. He recalled the party line: the essence of conscious discipline consists of the complete output of each one at his work site.

The commander supported those who spoke in the discussions. They adopted a specific decision. In implementing it, the members of the party buro concentrated individual work with people in the combat vehicle pool, organized comradesly mutual assistance, and intensified the demands on the communists for the state of affairs on specific sectors. The officers conducted talks with the soldiers and sergeants: "High performance is the guarantee of quality preparation for the exercise" and "Discipline and combat readiness are indivisible."

Following the example of the party members, the unit's Komsomols conducted a more active struggle for performance discipline. Achieving the efficient use of training time, the tank crews prepared for the exercise in an excellent manner, outstripping the established times, operated competently on it, and received a high grade.

It is precisely ensuring the personal example and vanguard role of the communists in service and accomplishment of military duty which permits the party organizations to have an effective influence on all aspects of the men's life,

including on the molding of a state of discipline in them, and on the creation of a healthy moral atmosphere in the subunits.

Since youths comprise the majority of the personnel in the regiment, the command and the communists are concerned that the Komsomol organization works in a combat manner. The commander, political officers, and the secretary of the party bureau participate in the conduct of Komsomol meetings and sessions of the Komsomol committee and bureau and go to meet the youth in the organization of mass-political and sports measures. They support Komsomol initiative directed toward raising the quality of combat training and strengthening discipline, friendship, and military comradeship.

I should especially like to talk about amiability. The youth is very sensitive to the display of haughtiness and, even if well concealed, indifference. For the accomplishment of social obligations is connected with the overcoming of certain difficulties and with various troubles. Effort and time must be expended to prepare for a talk or speech or to draw up visual agitation.

In addition, the influence of the Komsomol activists on the moral climate and the status of military discipline in the subunit is ensured, first of all, by the fact they themselves accomplish their service duties conscientiously and move in the vanguard of the competitors. You will agree that it is not easy to skillfully combine service and social matters. To offend a young man with callousness and inattention means discouraging his desire to display useful initiative for a long time.

Why do I say this? Unfortunately, officers are encountered who, in response to a request for assistance in the preparation of some measure, answer approximately as follows: "Find someone who is less busy." We have to correct the subunit commander who limited contact with the secretary of the Komsomol bureau to the standard phrase: "When will you, comrade sergeant, ensure the vanguard role of the Komsomols in military discipline?" In turn, the "teacher" could be late to a Komsomol meeting and proceed directly to the presidium without apologies without even being interested if he had been elected one of its members.

Just as harmful is the other extreme where instead of patiently teaching the activists on practical work, the officer tries to do everything himself. Excessive guardianship and organization minimize initiative and engender sluggishness, passivity, and a kind of dependence.

Much can be done to strengthen military discipline by means of cultural-educational work. Club and library councils and Lenin room councils are operating actively in the tank regiment. In particular, readers' conferences on the latest military-memoir and fiction literature are conducted regularly in the library and thematic soirees and matinees as well as meetings with unit veterans are conducted in the club. Considering the multinational composition of the troop collective, the activists devote many measures to the international indoctrination of the men and to the strengthening of friendship and troop comradeship. The regimental commander also finds time to participate in conferences and thematic soirees.

In our large unit there are many such officers who are able to work effectively with people, indoctrinate them, and inspire them to the zealous accomplishment of military duty. They are competent with ideological maturity, demandingness toward themselves and their associates, and the striving to consider the opinion of the personnel in the solution of urgent problems. At the same time, the very same omission is discovered in those officers who for the time being cannot brag about successes in the indoctrination of subordinates--an underestimation of a healthy moral-political climate in the collective and the indoctrinational role of public opinion. As they say, one need not go far for examples.

One of the last places in the large unit according to the results of socialist competition is occupied by the troop collective led by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nosov. Here they became accustomed to mediocre grades in combat training and the state of military discipline leaves much to be desired. The indoctrinational work style of the commander and individual officers suffers from flaws and the desire to "press" more on the vocal cords. Many indoctrinational measures are conducted in this collective just as everywhere. There is no shortcoming in meetings and conferences. Lectures and reports are given and talks are conducted. But for the present the effectiveness of this work is low because it is not consolidated by the personal example of some teachers. And really, what is the worth of the appeals, let us say, of officers N. Tarakanov and R. Mustafin to strengthen military discipline and organization as soon as they themselves commit serious deviations from the requirements of the regulations and moral standards?

An analysis conducted by the command and the political department of the large unit showed: The role of the party organization has been humbled in the collective and, as a result, its contribution to the strengthening of discipline is insufficient. Lieutenant Colonel Nosov and his closest assistants do not display the necessary interest in creating an atmosphere of mutual demandingness and raising the role of the public in the indoctrination of people. Such a position of the leaders is reflected in the most direct manner on the effectiveness of party work. Let us say that several communists reported on the accomplishment of party duty before their comrades. But the reports did not provide the desired result. Why? Communist Nosov avoided a principled talk, the party secretary followed his example, and other activists after him got off with stock phrases. The excessive "courtesy" of the party buro which basically "paid attention" instead of boldly disclosing shortcomings and achieving their elimination, of course, did not further an increase in the responsibility of the communists. After formal reports Comrades V. Anfilov and V. Byval'kevich committed disciplinary offenses.

Considering the situation which had developed, the command and the political department of the large unit recommended the conduct of an officers' call here with the agenda, "The officer--a model of performance and discipline." The personnel of the political department spoke with the people beforehand, disclosed the "painful" points in mutual relations, and advised many officers to occupy a more principled position when discussing an important question. The large-unit commander gave a report at the meeting. And actually, the talk about the personal example of the teachers themselves in service and discipline, according to the general opinion, proved to be useful. The majority of those who spoke, in particular Captains A. Dovgal', Ye. Maksimov, and



M. Butayev sharply criticized the behavior of those who disregard the requirements of the regulations. The violators of discipline felt very uncomfortable under the fire of collective condemnation. In short, a beginning had been made for favorable changes. However, it cannot be said that the commander, political officer, and party organization made full use of a favorable opportunity. The majority of the officers' recommendations just remained in the minutes of the meeting. The consolidation and preservation of principled public opinion and making it a permanently operating force in the struggle to strengthen prescribed order was not accomplished at once.

The command and, first of all, the political department of the large unit also see their own incomplete work in the fact that serious errors were committed in the collective led by Lieutenant Colonel Nosov. For what is the public of the unit and subunit? It is specific people, the troop collective, the political nucleus of which is the party organization. The role and influence of the public can be raised only by intensifying the combat vitality of the party organization. And its combat vitality depends on the leadership and assistance of the political department as well as on the ability of the commander to rely on the communists in the accomplishment of indoctrinational tasks. The measures which we have adopted, although, let us say directly, somewhat belated, permitted making the work of the party organization noticeably more active and increasing its influence on the moral atmosphere of the lagging collective. Communist Nosov is also making corrections in his work style.

And here is one more lesson which we extracted for ourselves. The Disciplinary Regulation, we stress once more, obliges the commander to devote special attention to the rallying of the troop collective, the prevention of subordinates' delinquencies, and the creation of an intolerant attitude toward violations of military discipline, using the force of public opinion in every possible way here. But all this must be patiently taught to commanders who recently assumed their posts, and especially commanders of the regimental, battalion, and company elements. Using the experience of such officers as Lieutenant Colonel Chernov, they should be taught the ability to rely on the support of party and Komsomol organizations, of all public organs, and on the strength and opinion of the collective and the ability to foresee the indoctrinational consequences of decisions and actions which have been adopted. And here lessons in the system of commanders' training, lectures, and seminars alone are insufficient, but daily individual work of the senior commander with each commander and objective assistance on the spot are required.

It is precisely on such work that the officers of the political department and staff and all communists of the division headquarters are oriented. And its first results show convincingly once again: high commander's demandingness joined together with party demandingness and the support of the public is the correct path toward the further strengthening of discipline, organization, and order in the units and subunits.

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## GROUND FORCES

### OUTSTANDING GROUND FORCES OFFICER PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Yurkin, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District:  
"Foremost Army and Navy People: The Battalion Commander's Three Orders"]

[Text] While talking with me Maj Igor' Stoderevskiy glances toward the obstacle course where his subordinates are working. It seems to me that they are functioning very adroitly and skillfully, but the battalion commander thinks otherwise. Excusing himself, he heads resolutely for one of the obstacles, the so-called labyrinth. He utters a curt "Not that way! Not that way!" on the move and swiftly goes through all the turns at a single breath. The airborne personnel admire their commander, who is tall, strong and capable.

"The secret is simple," the battalion commander explains, now calmly, to a soldier who is dawdling. "Make the body turn not only with the arms, but also using the legs. Take a careful look..."

The major covers the labyrinth once more, emphasizing his every movement and focusing attention on the important elements.

"Everything has its fine points," he says, renewing the interrupted conversation. "That is what training is for: to understand them."

Igor' Yur'yevich was born on the southern border. The career of his father, a party member and frontlinesman, was linked with border duty for long years. The childhood of Igor' occurred at outposts where there are sands, heat and imported water. In childhood even before school he began to dream about officer duty. He wanted to be like his father. His junior brother Yuriy also dreamed of the very same path.

After completing the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni V. I. Lenin, Lt Igor' Stoderevskiy took over a platoon. The subunit was outstanding for four years in a row. His first order, "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3d Class, reminds Igor' Yur'yevich about this very victory. Then the officer took over a company and it too held the title of outstanding for three years.

The older of the brothers already was considered an experienced officer when the younger brother was wearing a cadet's shoulderboards. The officer career brought Igor' together with Yuriy as part of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The older brother commanded a battalion and the younger brother a platoon. Maj I. Stoderevskiy and Sr Lt Yu. Stoderevskiy were awarded the orders of Red Star for courage and heroism in performing an international duty.

Maj Stoderevskiy also received his third order, the Red Banner, in Afghanistan.

"I was fortunate to meet with remarkable people, says the battalion commander. "I learned something from each of them. For example, at the beginning of my service I learned from Col Robert Pavlovich Mosalov, a frontlinesman who twice landed in the enemy rear."

Stoderevskiy took his volitional qualities from Valeriy Samsonov, at that time a senior lieutenant who commanded a cadet platoon. Igor' Yur'yevich has a kind word to say about the commander of the battalion in which his officer development took place. Maj Boris Borisovich Nekhimchuk persistently taught personnel to cross mountains and deserts. Subsequently this science came in very handy for Stoderevskiy.

"It is not only from the senior comrades that I learned and am learning," stresses the battalion commander. "A great deal also can be gotten from subordinates. In the position of company commander I was lucky with my political officer. Sr Lt Aleksandr Zuyev was able to find an approach to any person. I admit that at times I envied his art. It was thanks to Zuyev that I realized it is important not only to arrange combat training well, but also to organize the leisure time of subordinates no worse. Together we set up an amateur ensemble in the company and traveled to neighboring posts with concerts..."

Maj Stoderevskiy recalls other comrades in arms, particularly Lt Vyacheslav Posokhov, with whom fate brought him together in Afghanistan. The young officer gave an excellent account of himself. He commanded a platoon and a company, became a deputy battalion commander and received an order. It is difficult to part with such people, but Stoderevskiy unhesitatingly recommended his deputy for a higher position.

After duty in Afghanistan Stoderevskiy requested to be sent to one of the remote posts of the Transcaucasus. There are peaks with snow-white caps around and not far off is a range that is spacious for problem directors. Igor' Yur'yevich likes this, and he even likes the winds, to which he has become accustomed since childhood. The wearer of three orders took over a battalion with grand old traditions and in a short time he augmented them. The airborne personnel are demonstrating high results in final problems for the winter training period.

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## AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### MAJ GEN FEDOTOV KILLED IN TEST FLIGHT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 84 p 6

[Obituary signed by a group of comrades: "A. V. Fedotov"]

[Text] HSU Maj Gen Avn Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Fedotov, a prominent test pilot, CPSU member since 1956, Lenin Prize laureate, perished in a test flight on 4 April 1984.

Fedotov was born on 23 June 1932 in the city of Volgograd to a worker's family. After completing the Armavir School for Pilots in 1953, he served in Air Forces units and in 1958 he became a test pilot. In 1965 he completed the Moscow Aviation Institute without separation from test work.

He displayed high flying proficiency, coolness and courage in performing flight tests and research. He had detailed engineering knowledge and developed a number of new flight test methods which reduced the time periods for developing new aircraft. He was active in indoctrinating highly skilled test pilots and he performed extensive work in Air Forces units to pass on experience in mastering new aircraft.

Fedotov set 18 world air records for speed, altitude and rate of climb, a number of which have not been bettered to the present time. The Federation Aeronautique Internationale presented him with the highest award--the large gold medal--for an outstanding contribution to the development of aviation.

Fedotov was an imaginatively thinking, honest, highly educated person who was in love with his work.

The Soviet state highly esteemed Fedotov's services to the Motherland. He was awarded the Lenin Prize, he received the title of HSU and of Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, and he was decorated with many orders and medals.

The memory of A. V. Fedotov will live forever in the hearts of Soviet pilots, his friends and comrades, and his pupils, and in the aircraft which he gave a ticket to life.



## NAVAL FORCES

### OUTSTANDING NAVAL PILOT PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 84 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Leskov, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Foremost Army and Navy People: Courage and Proficiency of a Naval Pilot"]

[Text] Scheduled flights were under way aboard the ASW cruiser "Minsk." The aircraft took off vertically one after the other from the deck broad as a city boulevard to perform operational training missions. The precise, measured rhythm of take-offs and landings indicated that the flights were organized at the proper level and that the very complicated system of "ship-people-aircraft" was faultlessly adjusted.

Grown wise with experience in tactical coordination between navymen and aviators, the cruiser's commander unfailingly determined which of the pilots now was taking off from the deck or coming in for a landing. Each one had his own signature, and there was a special one for Lt Col Yu. Churilov: his flying had been taken to perfection.

His proficiency is the result of determined, selfless work multiplied by selfless love for his chosen profession. That is how Yuriy Ivanovich is described by the cruiser's commander and by everyone who knows Churilov well. It is a complete giving of oneself, self-discipline, and determination in achieving the set goal. And of course, it is a constant desire to see that everything he knows and is capable of himself becomes the property of subordinates. Many pilots who mastered a fundamentally new type of flying craft went through Churilov's school. Officers V. Ositnyanko and Ye. Matveyev, A. Desyatnikov and Ye. Dimin, and many others are grateful to Yuriy Ivanovich for the science.

Churilov has many long ocean deployments and many take-offs and landings on an unsteady deck, at times in a very difficult situation, behind him. Once during a vertical approach for a landing his aircraft suddenly lost more than a hundred meters of altitude in five seconds. Instants remained for making a decision. Churilov grasped them to level off the aircraft right at the very deck of the cruiser. As later was learned, a specialist who through negligence had not locked a nut on one of the linkages of the engine control system, was guilty for what happened. Only the pilot's supreme proficiency,

courage, self-control, and an instantaneous, accurate calculation allowed him to emerge from the critical situation successfully.

People here also remember another instance. At that time Churilov was returning after weather reconnaissance. He was making a quiet landing descent when suddenly it was as if an antiaircraft projectile had burst in front of the windshield. The pilot instinctively bent his head behind the instrument panel overhang. A series of dull blows passed along the aircraft's skin like a machinegun burst. The aircraft went into a dive, aiming at the swiftly approaching ground like the sharp descent of a needle. Churilov told later how he managed almost instinctively to move the cruise engine throttle quadrant to the limit and pull the control stick toward himself.

After he landed several clumps of gray feathers were discovered sticking to the fuselage skin and engine air intakes. Before flying south the birds had banded into flocks, and one of them had been on the aircraft's glide path.

For Lt Col Churilov the road to the sky began on Voronezh soil. He was born and grew up in a farmer's family and later studied in a radiotechnical institute, but an announcement about recruitment of cadets for a DOSAAF air club sharply altered his fate... After serving in a fighter regiment where he became a party member, he was sent to deck-based aviation as one of the best pilots. At that time it was just "getting its wings." That is how Officer Churilov's vertical take-off began. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA told about his flying and instructional proficiency last year.

Lt Col Ye. Churilov, a first class military pilot, recently received the title of HSU for attaining high indicators in mastering new combat equipment and for courage and heroism. On returning from Moscow where he was presented with the Gold Star Churilov again was flying over the ocean on the very next day.

6904

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## SPECIAL TROOPS

### BORDER GUARDS ENCOUNTER ARMED TRESPASSERS

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 13 Feb 84 p 4

[Article by Sr Lt S. Shapovalov: "A Soldier's Grandson"]

[Text] Forty years have passed since then, but the memory of the terrible war years will remain forever in the hearts of the Soviet people. Master Sergeant Vladimir Migal' was not fated to meet his grandfather, Aleksey. The valiant antitank fighter died on the Kursk Bulge. His exploit was a guiding star for the attainment of a goal for Vladimir.

Vladimir wanted to become a good soldier without fail. It was not easy to achieve this. They say that the army is a school of courage. However, at first service greets you with commonness. Here one must be able to do much for himself.

This is why Private Ivan Polyanskiy, who became the young soldier's patron, taught him what seemed to be trifles. But, it turns out, one cannot become a genuine soldier without them.

And Vladimir studied persistently and tempered his character. He became an expert of combat and political training and was appointed squad leader. But life prepared a most difficult examination....

The alarm signal sounded unexpectedly. The subunit commander informed his subordinates that a group of armed trespassers had been detected on the sector. In accordance with the task assignment for combat, Vladimir Migal' operated as part of the alert group which was headed by the outpost commander, Senior Lieutenant Viktor Vovk.

The officer surmised that the bandits would try to move out toward the pass rapidly, hide in the mountains and later, counting on a drop in the vigilance of the border guards, would break out of the trap.... Therefore, the shortest route was selected. The men tenaciously clambered up the steep hill. Even in summer, it was considered almost inaccessible and now, after a deep snow had fallen, each step was made with difficulty.

It had already begun to get dark when the alert group "straddled" the hill. Several clay structures were stuck along the slope at about 500 meters--the uninvited guests had hidden there. It turned out that the border guards did not hurry in vain! They did not succeed in getting away. They were in a trap.

Two strangers suddenly appeared on the slope of the mountain. "Bandits," Migal' decided. His assumption was confirmed by two bursts of automatic rifles which resounded in the mountains with an echo. Vladimir hid behind a rock. His heart beat desperately. There could be no doubts: the trespassers would miss no chance to get away.

It grew dark rapidly. A dense fog blanketed the peaks. "Visibility is poor. The bandits will use it for sure--they are preparing to break through. They have nothing to lose! They mustn't be allowed to collect themselves." Vladimir shared his thoughts with the officer. The latter supported the master sergeant's suggestion.

The soldiers operated quickly and in a coordinated manner. At first the trespassers did not even notice the rush of the attacking group which was headed by Master Sergeant Migal'. A little more, and the border guards would emerge in their rear.

An assault rifle struck at this very second: the men had been discovered. Master Sergeant Migal' saw Private Vsevolod Priymak fall down heavily into a snowdrift. "He must be wounded. He has to be helped!" But he was beaten by Senior Sergeant Yuriy Oknyan and Private Yevgeniy Buzdakov. Long bursts ripped the frozen snow crust, and Yuriy and Yevgeniy carried their comrade to cover.

When dawn broke over the land, the main forces appeared in the area where the trespassers had been blocked up.

The bandits were brought out one by one. They threw down their weapons and, hanging their heads in a downcast manner, they made their way along a narrow path toward the road which became a road of soldierly valor for Master Sergeant Migal's comrades.

Heroism is not spoken of in loud words. These concepts are obliterated and grow shallow from their frequent repetition. But they are ennobled by the deeds of those who are able and love to work and who think first of the motherland and then of themselves.

One such person--Vladimir Migal'--is a young communist and a master sergeant of an excellent post. He was awarded the medal "For Combat Services" for skillful actions in detaining the armed trespassers. His service was also noted by the medal "For Distinction in Guarding the USSR State Border" and by badges of soldierly valor.

Master Sergeant Migal' is a considerate commander who performs his duties in an exemplary manner and grieves for the collective's interests. And isn't that why, in speaking about his service, Vladimir strives to tell as much as possible about his comrades?

That is how he is, the grandson of a soldier of the Great Patriotic War, our contemporary, Master Sergeant Vladimir Migal'.

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## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### KGB HIGHER COMMAND SCHOOL IMENI F.E. DZERZHINSKIY PROFILED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 8 Feb 84)  
pp 14-15

[Article by F. Popenko: "The Higher Border..."]

[Text] "I dreamed of becoming a border-guard officer from childhood. The dream was born under the influence of motion pictures and books about the servicemen in the green service caps, under the influence of the stories of fellow-villagers who served on the border...."

"I also came to the school from civilian life and I do not regret it...."

"And before becoming officer candidates, we gave a year and a half to service in the border troops...."

This is what Sergeant Yu. Kiporov (fourth course), first-course officer candidate L. Repka, officer candidate V. Grachev (first course), and graduating Sergeant M. Kurakin said during our talk.

Even prior to arriving in the school we decided to meet with graduating officer candidates and first-year men. We wanted to compare them externally and to learn how they both evaluate their selection of a difficult profession and what was greater in it: romanticism or deliberate calculation. Judging by the statements presented as an epigraph, the selection was not by chance--reflection and thorough planning are behind it.

The graduating students, of course, can easily be distinguished not only by the four stripes on the sleeve. They are people who are smart in appearance and confident in themselves, they remain calm, and answer questions clearly and in a well reasoned manner. The uniform does not sit so well on the newcomers and they converse timidly. Nevertheless, both the former and the latter have the same or close point of view on the main questions.

Platoon party group organizer Sergeant Yu. Kiporov, who is a squad leader, grew up in the village of Belomechetskaya, Kochubeyevskiy rayon, Stavropol kray. He studied in secondary school No 10. There he underwent primary military training under the military instructor, Captain (Reserve) V. Zernikov. The

acquired knowledge also helped at first in the school. He immediately set out at a good rate--his grades were basically only excellent. Now Yu. Kiporov is receiving the scholarship imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. He is a rated sportsman.

Another communist--M. Kurakin--also serves as an example in training. By birth he is from the suburban-Moscow city of Ishka. After completing the 8th grade, he worked as an electrician, completed night school, and was called up to the border troops. The difficult service really attracted him and he decided to become an officer. He passed the examinations in the school successfully. His comrades demonstrated great confidence in M. Kurakin, electing him deputy secretary of the company party buro. He is attracted by various types of sport. He has a second-class rating in marksmanship.

V. Grachev spent his childhood years in the city of Bolshevo, Moscow Oblast. His biography is similar to the biography of his fellow-countryman, M. Kurakin. After the 8th grade, Vyacheslav entered GPTU [city vocational and technical school] No 2 of the city of Mytishchi, completed it, and worked as a fitter. He recalls with kind words his military instructor, M. Il'in, who taught him the elements of military affairs. He served for a year and a half on the border, liked it, and decided to become an officer. V. Grachev is the secretary of the platoon Komsomol organization.

The same public mission is had by officer candidate L. Repka, who came to the school from the village of Novaya Vodolaga, Kharkov Oblast, where he studied in secondary school No 1 and where a love for military affairs was instilled in him by the military instructor, Sergeant (Reserve) V. Stepanenko.

Without talking things over, all four answered in approximately the same manner the question of what was most difficult during the first days of their stay in the school: there was not enough time to prepare for lessons and for letters home. And for those without prior service, at first they wanted to sleep and eat "at an unauthorized time" (they now speak of this with a smile), and for some it was difficult to become accustomed to army procedure.

The officer candidates with whom we had the occasion to speak in Alma-Ata advise youngsters who desire to become border guards officers to become firmly convinced of their choice first of all and to realize that it will be difficult to study and serve. And if this does not frighten them, to undertake NVP [primary military training] and sport conscientiously, accustom themselves to work and independence in the large and small (let us say, they should sew a button on a shirt or wash their socks themselves without waiting for mama to do it), instill discipline and performance in themselves, and not shun social work. To succeed in all school subjects is an obvious requirement.

We believe that this advice is useful for all youths who dream of becoming officers.

And now, let us tell about the educational institution where the officer candidates with whom we have acquainted you are studying.

## The School

The Higher Border Command Order of the October Revolution and Red Banner School of the KGB USSR imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy is one of the oldest military-educational institutions of the Border Troops. It was established in Kharkov in December 1931 as a multi-discipline school to train commanders: infantrymen, cavalrymen, signalmen, motor vehicle personnel, tankmen, aviators, and weapons technicians for the Border and Internal Troops. In 1932 the school was converted to the Kharkov Cavalry Military School for Border and Internal Troops imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. Men who had passed through the rigorous school on the border became its officer candidates.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the school was moved to Tashkent, and in August 1944, to Alma-Ata. It was renamed the Alma-Ata Border School in the year of victory. The history of the school is rich with examples of the selfless service of its graduates to the Communist Party and the Soviet people and of the courage and steadfastness in battles with the motherland's enemies in the defense of the state border. Twenty-seven graduates have been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including A. Ye. Makhalin, V. M. Usov, N. S. Prudnikov, and V. D. Bubenin, and 50 became generals.

In 1975 the school was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and in 1981--the Order of the October Revolution. These awards are a high evaluation of its collective's services in the training of officer personnel for the Border Troops.

Experienced teachers are working here, the majority of whom served on the border for many years, such as, for example, the chief of the school, Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant General M. K. Merkulov. Many have scientists' degrees and titles.

What do the officer candidates study? Just as in any higher educational institution: the history of the CPSU, scientific communism, philosophy, and political economy. The schedules also include military pedagogy, psychology, electronics, a foreign language and, of course, special disciplines. All officer candidates engage in sports--many sections are operating here, and the majority participate in amateur talent activities. A rich library is at their service. Naturally, they regularly visit theaters, museums, conservatories, and exhibitions.

The comprehensive training and profound knowledge help the school's graduates to accomplish the tasks of protecting our motherland's borders later. They are awarded the rank of lieutenant and are awarded an all-union-type diploma attesting to a higher education (specialty--teacher of primary military training and physical education) and a badge.

Period of instruction is four years.

### Conditions for Acceptance

The school accepts males from 17 years of age (even if the 17th year is celebrated at the end of the entry year) to 21 years of age from among the civilian

youth and those who are serving in the Armed Forces; privates, sergeants, and master sergeants of the reserve--up to 23 years of age, politically conscious, morally mature, having a secondary education, and in good health.

What documents are needed for entrance?

If we are speaking about civilians, they need to submit an application to the personnel office of the Committee or Directorate for State Security for the place of residence prior to 30 March of the year of entry (servicemen submit their applications through channels to the unit commander prior to 25 February). The following should be indicated in the application: last name, first name, patronymic, date of birth, place of residence, name of school. The following should be appended: an autobiography, reference from the place of work or study, party or Komsomol reference, a copy of the document concerning a secondary education certified by a notary (pupils of the 10th grade present a certificate showing current progress), birth certificate, certified photos without headgear (4.5x6--three photos, 3x4--three photos), and a medical certificate. The passport, military service record book, call-up registration notice, original document concerning a secondary education, and birth certificate are submitted by the candidate to the acceptance commission on arrival at the school.

What examinations must be taken?

There are four of them: in the Russian language and literature--written and oral, on the history of the USSR and geography--oral. Requirements--at the level of secondary school. In addition, to determine physical fitness the candidates are tested in exercises for the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] (civilian youth) and for the VSK [military sports complex] (servicemen). Examinations for civilians are from 10-20 July. Those who pass them are enrolled as officer candidates in the first course, and the remainder are detached to their former place of residence or service.

During the period of entrance examinations, the candidates are in a barracks environment and they are offered dormitory space and food. During training the officer candidates receive uniforms, food, and pay in accordance with the established norms. Those who successfully take examinations for transfer from course to course have an annual 30-day leave as well as a two-week holiday in winter.

The Reserve

The "Pogranichnik" [Border Guard] youth military-patriotic school [YuVPSH] in which youngsters from the 8th and 9th grades who dream of becoming officers are engaged is functioning in the school. Acceptance in it is accomplished on the basis of personal applications, parents' agreement, and recommendations of the Komsomol committees of educational institutions.

Its goal is molding in the teenagers an active life's position and lofty moral-political and physical qualities, the generation of a high sense of responsibility and a developed sense of duty to the Communist Party and the Soviet people as well as a readiness to defend the socialist fatherland, and instilling a love for military service and the profession of a border guards officer. The school is directed by a staff which includes, in addition to school personnel, the



secretary of ad hoc Komsomol organization and representatives of the RK [rayon committee] of the Komsomol and the parents' committee.

The "Border Guards" youth military-patriotic school has its own Red Banner, promise on oath, and a common uniform. The trainees' duties are defined by a regulation approved by the head of the school and the secretary of the rayon Komsomol committee.

For eight months, the teenagers are engaged in political, firing, border, military-technical, and physical training and they study the general military and other regulations, weapons of mass destruction, and means of protection against them. Lessons are two or three times a month for two hours each. We will mention only some of the program's subjects. "The Soviet Armed Forces and their Historic Mission and Organizational Structure," "The Law of the Soviet State Border," "The History and Combat Path of the Border Troops," "Subversive Activity of Imperialist States on the USSR Borders," "Service Animals Employed in Guarding the Border," "Pathfinding. Tricks Employed by Border Violators and Ways to Recognize Them," and "Procedures for Unarmed Combat."

We saw the interest with which the youngsters listen at the lessons of experienced border guards. And even if not all graduates of the youth military-patriotic school become officer candidates of precisely this school, the knowledge obtained here will help them both in military service and in life. The school is making its contribution to the upbringing of patriots, that is, to the accomplishment of one of the tasks posed by the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Today's generation of officer candidates and their replacements will add to the glory of the Dzerzhinskiy-officers. Acquaintance with the school convinces us of this.

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## AFGHANISTAN

### KIRGHIZ SOLDIER WOUNDED IN AFGHANISTAN RECEIVES MEDAL, PRAISE

Frunze SOVetskaya Kirgiziya in Russian 23 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by L. Gromadskiy: "Dzholoy Chyntemirov's Red Star"]

[Text] The newspaper SOVetskaya Kirgiziya reported briefly on 26 January 1984, in the material "With Weapon and Heart," that the Kirgiz, Guards Senior Lieutenant Dzholoy Akimkanovich Chyntemirov, had been awarded the Order of the Red Star for courage and heroism displayed in the performance of his international duty in friendly Afghanistan.

Our countryman, Army General Nikolay Grigor'yevich Lyashchenko, was one of the first to congratulate him on the motherland's high decoration and later, in the name of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he awarded the valiant soldier from Kirghizia a combat order.

They impatiently awaited news from their son in the Chyntemirov's home. The head of the family, Akimkan, calmed his wife as best he could: "If he doesn't write, there must be a reason. Perhaps he moved from place to place and he has a new address, perhaps he is on a long official trip...." He, himself, felt with all his heart: something happened, it cannot be that for so many days Dzholoy could not scribble at least a few words. But hope glimmered in his soul.

And somewhere far from his native places he was just as worried and ate his heart out with indecision as to what to do and what to report about himself to the people closest to him, his father and mother. Dzholoy is their son. He would have "built the bridge" long ago, this thought had entered his head many times already. He only had to make the decision. One circumstance held him back. He could not write although there was every opportunity for this: what to write on, and where to write, and there was also enough time. However, he shuddered at the mere sight of a pen, pencil, and clean sheet of paper. He received no peace from the thought: could I write at all, and when?

...He is 24 years old today. But then, at the time of his most flowering youth, when he had the certificate in his hands, and had made the correct choice, and his boyish imagination pictured a new life ahead heretofore unknown, the lad was not even 17 years of age. He was several months too young to enter the

educational institution of which he had dreamed since childhood and which he selected according to his liking on a level with others such as he, yesterday's tenth-graders.

For many days already he haunted the threshold of the rayon military commissariat and each time he returned from there empty-handed. They refused to send him to study in a military school for one reason: his age would not permit it. But he had hurried and did not want to lag behind his schoolmates who, just as he, had expressed the desire to choose the military profession and serve in the army as officers.

Dzholoy Chyntemirov also displayed character here. He could not agree with the arguments that "you still have everything ahead of you and that "the year will pass unnoticed and you will realize your dream." "No," he said to himself, "everything does not come by itself." He had often heard from his elders, and this had been cut fast into his head: knock on any door. And he "knocked." He appealed to the school and local Soviet, and finally got everything with the same request--help me, look into it-- in the Komsomol raykom. He did not complain, he explained: "You can't leave me without my comrades. For so many years we studied together, grew up together, and were friends. And what does it mean to lose a year? It is idleness for one's entire life...."

In the raykom they listened to the youth with understanding, wrote a letter of petition to the military commissariat, and handed him a good testimonial. It is not ruled out that later they telephoned the necessary instance from the raykom and requested that they "turn attention" to the unyielding country lad.

Listening to D. Chyntemirov now and comparing his behavior with the actions which he is accomplishing, it is not difficult to imagine how everything actually occurred. Having secured the documents of recommendation in the Komsomol raykom, the tall Dzholoy ran to the military commissariat not feeling his feet beneath him. He was conducted to the military commissar with the confidential papers. And the latter, having read them attentively, smiled and somehow, in a familiar way, he took the slender youth in in a glance and said with a sigh: "Such impudent characters are a sin...."

And subsequently, things took their normal course. A medical board was convened, and its conclusion: "Suitable."

A new reading of the days, months, and years of his military biography began for Dzholoy Chyntemirov. Four years passed unnoticed. The graduation of the school's officer candidates. Officers' send-off. Assignment. There was also a leave. Lieutenant D. Chyntemirov managed to visit his native village of Chon-Uryukta which is on the blue Issyk-Kul.

Father Akimkan and mother Tursun were happy that their older son had attained his goal. They proudly walked about the village with him and were photographed as a souvenir and, in the evenings, so that no one saw, the two of them quietly lamented and were sorry that the meeting with their son was so brief. The mother could not keep back the tears and knew that a long separation lay ahead.

Just as is customary according to Kirghiz customs, the send-off for the dear guest was noisy. Everyone wished Dzholoy bon voyage and a happy return. Someone hinted at an early wedding. And everything would surely have been like this were it not for what occurred on one of the distant Afghan roads.

They were transporting cargoes which the country greatly needed. They were produce, rice, sugar, cement, timber, boards, and other materials. They were building schools, rural clubs, residential homes, and stores together with the Afghans. They again sat down in the vehicles and again carried the cargoes.

It was like this this time, too. The column of vehicles moved in the direction of an abandoned village in the mountains. The day was hot and the temperature in the open sun reached more than 50 degrees. Some 40 kilometers remained to the final point. And suddenly the command: "Temporary halt!" It was transmitted from crew to crew like an echo. The vehicles suddenly put on the brakes one after the other. But this was not a "soldiers' smoke break."

From D. Chyntemirov's recollections. "The temporary halt was not by accident. The column was met by a group of (dushmans).

...An enemy light machinegun began to chatter furiously quite nearby. One of the soldiers who was next to the commander shouted: "Comrade Lieutenant, you have blood on your sleeve...."

These were the last words which Chyntemirov heard. Six bullets had pierced his left arm and one bullet wounded his left side. A second burst fractured the right hand.

From the medical findings: "While accomplishing a mission, Lieutenant Dzholoy Akimkanovich Chyntemirov received a serious wound with avulsion to the left forearm and a bullet and fragment wound in the right hand...."

The enemy is cruel and cunning. Nourished by the darkest forces of reaction, the counterrevolution in Afghanistan stops at nothing. It is blowing up schools and hospitals, shooting down at pointblank range peaceful residents, children, women, and the elderly, and shooting at those who came to the fraternal country with the best of intentions to help erect new homes, bridges, and roads and bring up cargoes to build a new life. It is mercilessly destroying everything which lands in the sight of the automatic rifle, machinegun, and grenade launcher.

Did Lieutenant Chyntemirov think of an exploit? No, he did not. He simply performed his international duty honestly.

Dzholoy Chyntemirov did not regain consciousness even when they carried him to the hospital. The first thing for which the doctors struggled at those important minutes was the life of the Soviet soldier. None of the medical personnel doubted that the left arm had to be amputated. An emergency operation was required. Well, and what about the right arm? The doctors did everything possible within their power. When they began to apply the sutures during the operation, the patient suddenly opened his eyes and began to moan painfully. A burning pain reverberated through his entire body. He uttered barely distinctly: "hand."



"Lay quietly soldier," the surgeon repeated this word from habit. "you will have a hand, without fail you will...."

Dzholoy Chyntemirov did not know then, and really he could not know, how much these words cost the doctors and how much effort they applied during the operation to save and "revive" at least one of his hands.

There were many of them. People who did not remain indifferent to the soldier's fate. They were always near at the most difficult time when Chyntemirov was bedridden. The immobility frightened him. There was no left arm, and the other one was in plaster. Even in his thoughts he was afraid to pronounce the terrible word "cripple." He did not stop thinking: "Really for my entire life?"

D. Chyntemirov remembers well the names of those in the white smocks who first read his thoughts and clearly pictured the inconsolability into which the young fellow had fallen. They were the surgeons T. Rustamov and V. Abel'dyayev, nurse N. Belova, the head of the hospital, A. Zakal'skiy, and others.

In the hospital was a Komsomol leader whom everyone liked very much. He understood with all his heart the misfortune which had befallen D. Chyntemirov. He suffered because the latter could not write a letter home. One day he proposed: "Let's write together." Dzholoy refused. The Komsomol organizer then took the responsibility and wrote to Dzholoy's birthplace about everything as it is. And Chyntemirov's father and mother soon arrived at the hospital. It was difficult for them, but they became calm and thanked the Komsomol organizer for writing the truth.

From the recollections of D. Chyntemirov. "One day nurse Nadya Belova sat down beside my cot. In her hands was a book by Boris Polevoy, 'A Story About a Real Person.' 'If you want, I'll read,' she turned to me tenderly. And later she again brought books, read, and advised what was important for me to read myself. For me, her moral support was better than any medicine."

His brother-soldiers did not forget about their comrade. D. Chyntemirov preserves their warm soldierly letters as his dearest treasures. Private Val'bekov, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] M. Chernach, and others wrote.

Here are lines from the letter of Senior Lieutenant Yu. Shevmer:

"Dear Dzholov, all the fighting men and commanders of our subunit are proud of your courage and wish you the most rapid recovery...."

Later D. Chyntemirov will receive many more letters. Some of them will come from enterprises, kolkhozes, and institutes where former fighting men with whom he served are working and studying.

One more person persistently followed the fate of the soldier from Kirghizstan and is interested in him even today. He is Army General Nikolay Grigor'yevich Lyashchenko. He sent letters and congratulatory postcards on holidays to D. Chyntemirov and called him not only his countryman, but also his son.

We present an excerpt from the letter of Army General N. G. Lyashchenko which he wrote to the hospital at the end of last year:

"Valor and a readiness for an exploit always were inherent in Soviet servicemen... You displayed high courage in actively performing your international duty. I am proud of my valiant countryman from the banks of the wonderful Issyk-Kul. I wish you, Dzholoy, good health, happiness, and new successes in labor for the good of our motherland.

With deep respect I embrace you as my own.

Army General N. G. Lyashchenko

And now the most terrible was already behind him. The young organism held out. The doctors did everything possible to heal the serious wounds quickly. A new test awaited Chyntemirov: what road to take, what selection to make. The former was determined by medicine: he could draw up documents as an invalid of the first group. It was only necessary to consent. But there was a second choice: "To ply the oars more strongly and go against the stream," as Dzholoy read in a famous book. He selected the second, more difficult one.

He selected it because that is what he was taught in school and in the army, taught by the Komsomol and the party. He became a candidate member of the CPSU long before what had happened. Running somewhat ahead, let us report that the candidate period of D. Chyntemirov expires this March and those who will give him a recommendation for entry as a CPSU member will write without wavering: he honestly acquitted himself during the period as party candidate.

During the last months of his stay in the hospital, Dzholoy began to look into the library more often, gulped down books and, in the intervals between readings, he took his hand and persistently began, as once in school, to drill in writing. He felt nervous when he could not secure for a long time a pen or pencil in the fingers which remained on the right hand. But as soon as he succeeded in doing this, he zealously began to trace out each letter painstakingly. They did not follow the general rules of calligraphy: sometimes they were scattered over the paper in disorder, sometimes they tumbled over one another, and sometimes they were too big or, conversely, very small. When absolutely nothing was achieved, Chyntemirov tore into tiny pieces the sheets of paper which were covered with scrawls. But he only had to calm down a little, and he again undertook writing.

Weeks of intense drills passed like this. One day, reading the book by N. G. Lyashchenko, "Years in Overcoats," Dzholoy very much wanted to write down one interesting moment from the story but, as luck would have it, there was not a scrap of clean paper near at hand. And then he decided to do it directly in the margins of the book. And how he rejoiced when he wrote the needed note without special labor. Below these lines he clearly and painstakingly traced out one more sentence: "I can write!" Not believing his eyes that everything turned out so well, he repeated these words aloud several times. They inspired him and added strength.

Now Dzholoy Akimkanovich recalls this with pride: "Yes, I spoiled a page of a book of which I had grown fond then, but I had mastered the rule: if you set a goal for yourself, you must attain it!"

And still later D. A. Chyntemirov wrote in an application with his own hand, which was addressed to the Soviet minister of defense, the words which have been meaningful for a long time and been tested by time: "I want to request permission to continue to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces." Having dispatched the letter to the required address, he then suffered keenly. Those several weeks while he had to wait for a reply seemed an eternity to him. Various thoughts entered his head and irritated his soul: will they understand me correctly, will they verify my strength?! At that moment there came back to his memory the story of the general without both hands who is still serving in the army; he gives lectures for officer candidates and participates in tactical exercises. The recollections of the general somehow calmed him and instilled hope.

And now, one day.... It was after the doctors' regular rounds. In the corridor someone said loudly: "Chyntemirov--to the chief of the hospital section!"

Dzholoy did not expatiate much on the talk which then took place in the office of the section chief. One thing is unquestionable: during that possibly last meeting in the hospital both were equally excited. Both the one who prepared himself for this critical step for long days and nights and who staunchly passed the examination for strength, and the one who, relying on the collective experience of the doctors and his own experience, gave all his talent and ability to return to the person what is most dear--life--and, together with it, a capacity for work which is so necessary to each one. The latter--Valeriy Dmitriyevich Abel'dyayev--gave Dzholoy the joyous news: he had been awarded the next rank of senior lieutenant ahead of schedule and has been permitted to continue his service in the country's Armed Forces.

Like two soldiers, like two brothers, they stood silent for several instants and openly looked each other in the eye. They both understood, each in his own way: now, when they so wanted to speak, there was no need for many beautiful words. They had both accomplished their sacred duty honestly.

Quite recently, when these lines were written, Army General Nikolay Grigor'yevich Lyashchenko called from Moscow and asked Lieutenant D. A. Chyntemirov to come to the telephone. His first words were: "How is your health, how do you feel, have you obtained a new assignment?"

On the other end of the line he heard a confident, calm voice: "Everything is well, I am healthy, and I like my new service, comrade general!"

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